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J C Prichard's Concept ofMoral Insanity-
a Medical Theory ofthe Corruption of Human Nature
HANNAH FRANZISKA AUGSTEIN*
In the eighteenth century, insanity was widely explained within the Lockean
philosophical framework of enlightened rationality: delusions or illusions, basically
erroneous thinking, led human reason into the wrong. By the beginning ofthe nineteenth
century, after the French Revolution and in the midst of the transformations which the
industrial revolution brought about, new theories of insanity emerged. The realm of
unsoundness changed its character and became as unfathomable as the epoch appeared to
many who were witnessing it. Increasingly, cases of insanity became known where the
patients did not seem to dwell in some delusive state. They displayed deep sullenness,
unmitigated fury, utter shamelessness, seemingly without either purpose or motivation.
One of the constructs newly used to explain the evidence was the concept of moral
insanity. It referred to a derangement ofthose mental faculties which presided over man's
emotive framework as well as his moral faculty. It was formulated by the Bristol doctor
James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), who put it forward first in 1833, in an article in The
cyclopaedia ofpracticalmedicine.' In the Treatise on insanity, published in 1835, he gave
his account of medical knowledge on madness,2 inscribing moral insanity into medical
nosology and embedding the doctrine in his medical philosophy. In the course of his
elaborations of the concept, Prichard presented a number of case studies which he had
solicited from other doctors in order to prove his theory. One of these was the case of "a
gentleman" provided by his Bristol colleague, John Addington Symonds, who reported
that:
In his social relations [the gentleman] had become fickle, suspicious, and irascible; he was reckless
in his expenditure, and uncertain in his projects, while his general behaviour was such as to impress
almost every one who came in contact with him. [However, there was no] evidence that he
entertained any belief in things morally or physically impossible, or in opposition to the general
opinion ofmankind.... [He] had suffered a severe concussion ofthe brain, and since his recovery
had conducted himselfmoreextravagantly than ever. He advertised for sale property which he knew
to be entailed; after a little increase ofincome by the death of a near relative, he commenced great
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alterations in his residence, and before they were finished suddenly left his family, together with a
large establishment, under the care of a youth, his son, who was provided with no other means of
supplying the wants of the household than a power of attorney for collecting rents. [The man had
inflicted] so great injury to property in which he had only a life-interest, had involved himself so
deeply in debt, and was, notwithstanding, so lavish and absurd in his expenditure, that it became a
very desirable object to enforce some restraint upon his actions.
"After due deliberation", Symonds ended, "I came to the conclusion, that, although I had
been unable totrace any positive intellectual error, there was such amorbid condition ofthe
feelings, habits, and motives, as to constitute a case of what has been correctly designated
by Dr. Prichard as moral insanity. I therefore did not hesitate to sign the usual certificate".3
The communications by Symonds and other alienists seemed to confirm the theory of
moral insanity.4 Prichard had defined it as a form of
madnessconsisting in amorbidperversion ofthenaturlfeelings, affections, inclinations, temper,habits,
moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or
knowing andreasoning faculties, and particularly without any insaneillusion orhallucination.
People suffering from this mental disorder displayed, Prichard wrote, "eccentricity of
conduct, singular and absurd habits" combined with "a wayward and intractable temper,
with a decay ofsocial affections, an aversion to the nearest relatives and friends formerly
beloved,-in short, with a change in the moral character ofthe individual".5
Neither the sources of the concept nor its social and philosophical implications have
been described conclusively. It has been variously suggested that moral insanity linked up
with later notions concerning "lesions of the will power",6 or that the concept derived
from tenets of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, or from the French alienists Philippe
Pinel and Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol.7 But most ofthose scholars who put forward
these theories were merely cursorily interested in Prichard. His theories on madness rarely
stood at the centre ofinvestigation.8
3 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
4 Prichard collected his cases where he could find
them. He used material sent to him by his colleagues,
excerpts from medical literature and personal
experience. An analysis ofhis cases would certainly
be interesting. This, as well as many other issues
which I can only hint at here, is more fully addressed
in my forthcoming PhD thesis on Prichard
(University College London).
5 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 6, 23-4. In
1840, he enumerated ten salient features ofmoral
insanity; they include "a state ofexcitement ...
alternate with corresponding depression", "the
propensity to make extravagantpurchases",
"garrulity", to "melancholy", see Prichard,
'Insanity', in Alexander Tweedie (ed.), The library of
medicine, London, Whittaker, 8 vols, 1840-42,
vol. 2, pp. 112-13 (Prichard's emphases).
6See Eric T Carlson and Norman Dain, 'The
meaning ofmoral insanity', Bull. Hist. Med., 1962,
36: 130-40, on pp. 137-9; Joel Peter Eigen,
Witnessing insanity: madness and mad-doctors in the
English court, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1995, pp. 77-9. Roger Smith regards Maudsley's
theories on the influence ofheredity on insanity as a
repetition ofPrichardian tenets (see Roger Smith,
Trial by medicine: insanity and responsibility in
Victorian trials, Edinburgh University Press, 1981,
on p. 54); so does H Werlinder, Psychopathy: a
history ofthe concepts; analysis ofthe origin and
development ofafamily ofconcepts in
psychopathology, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell,
1978, p. 48.
7 Carlson and Dain, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 134;
Eigen, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 77. Walker and
McCabe maintained that'Prichard "was simply
importing the view ofPinel and Esquirol", see Nigel
Walker and Sarah McCabe, Crime and insanity in
England, 2 vols, Edinburgh University Press, 1973,
vol. 2, p. 208.
8Apart from Carlson and Dain, Walker and
McCabe, Prichard's moral insanity has been dealt
with mainly by nineteenth-century authors. See J C
Bucknill, D Hack Tuke, A manual ofpsychological
medicine, London, Churchill, 1858, pp. 101-20; D H
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This article proposes to look at two issues: first, it will probe the theoretical
predicaments which inspired Prichard to come up with the concept ofmoral insanity, and
inthe course ofthis Prichard's previously neglected sources will be examined. Second, the
paper will also discuss the concept ofmoral insanity itselfand enquire into its underlying
implications as well as into the functions which it fulfilled within Prichard's political and
religious viewpoints. In particular, I will ask how far "moral insanity" was an expression
ofPrichard's religious views and to what extent it was presented as a response to the rise
ofcapitalist society.
In the contemporary historiography of madness, there is a strong urge to unmask the
economic or professional interests which informed the medical theories of nineteenth-
century alienists. Scholars such as Andrew Scull, David Mellett, and Richard Russell have
helped to put the history of madness into perspective.9 At first sight, the case described
above may appear as evidence of Prichard's desire to enlarge thejuridical competencies
of his profession. But a closer look reveals that his work allows this kind of analysis to
only a very limited extent. To read his writings in this light would be to mistake the actual
non-medical sub-textofhis theories. Since this paperinvolves many differentcomponents
it may be useful to give a short outline of what it proposes to do. By retracing Prichard's
route to moral insanity, I wish to demonstrate that the theory reflected Prichard's dismay
at the decline of religion in a materialist age. Yet, the concept of moral insanity was not
merely the disillusioned response of a cultural pessimist to everything he disliked about
his epoch. By explaining madness within the framework of humoralism as a bodily
constitution, Prichard dispensed with the idea that reason was the supreme arbiter of
humanity. He showed madness to be part ofthe human condition: anybody was liable to
become mad. The descent into madness proper was the result ofaccidental circumstances.
By virtue ofthis theory Prichard defied the pretensions ofthe phrenologists who claimed
to have found a key to the human psyche. In his anti-phrenological approach, based on
non-cerebral sources of madness, Prichard was heavily inspired by German Romantic
medicine. However, it was only in the 1840s that he finally acknowledged the intimate
links between German teachings and his theory of moral insanity. How little Prichard
shared contemporary attempts to bolster the image of the medical profession, how little,
indeed, he believed that medicine could do anything about the depraved state of human
nature, is revealed inhis answerto thequestion underwhatcircumstances itwas necessary
to certify a mentally disturbed person.
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Deflinitions ofMoral Insanity
The term "moral insanity" had already been employed in the eighteenth century by
Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Rush. But they saw the perversion ofthe moral sense as a
result of madness-not as the definition of the disorder. Their ideas, therefore, had little
to do with Prichard's understanding ofthe term.10 Prichard himselfsaw parallels between
the notion of moral insanity and the theory of Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol
(1772-1840), the famous Paris mad-doctor." Prichard even averred that Esquirol had
identified the salient characteristic of moral insanity-the absence of intellectual
delusion.12 He was justified in so far as Esquirol had introduced "the view that the
obsessional disorders were a form ofinsanity",.13 Ironically, however, the French alienist
dissociated himself explicitly from Prichard's definition of moral insanity, for Esquirol
insisted that all forms of madness were accompanied by a lesion of the understanding.'4
Only after Esquirol's death in 1840 would Prichard no longerrefer "moral insanity" to the
French doctor's concept of"monomania". In 1842 he wrote: "With great deference to this
justly celebrated physician we venture to observe that the term monomania does not
appear applicable to a disorder which is not characterised by any particular error or
delusion".15 But there are other authors whom Prichard read and quoted and whom, in his
Treatise on insanity, he did not credit with having inspired him.
Prichard was a very pious man. Born in Ross, Herefordshire, in 1786, he was brought
up in Bristol as a Quaker. Even though, in 1810, he converted to Anglicanism, he never
forsook stern religious concern and a literal belief in Scripture's tenets which became
increasingly rare among his fellow-scientists. Prichard's father was a merchant with a
penchant for erudition, so his son was given the opportunity to study medicine in
Edinburgh where he became familiar with the doctrines of Scottish Enlightenment
philosophy and medical theory. Subsequently he became a doctor in Bristol where he
treated pauper lunatics as well as more affluent patients. Throughout his life, Prichard's
energies were divided between the medical profession and his investigations into
anthropology andphilology. His anthropology was transcendental anddeeply teleological:
he was interested in moral redemption, intellectual and cultural perfection. He saw man in
the light of final causes and was not concerned with the tedious fetters of physical
circumstances which prevented him from fulfilling his rational and moral potential. A
resume of Prichard's scholarly endeavours-anthropological as well as physiological-
can be made in four words: to save man's soul.
10 Thomas Arnold, Observations on the nature, near Paris (Prichard's article on 'Temperaments', in
kinds, causes andprevention ofinsanity, 2 vols, op. cit., note 1 above, vol. 4, p. 172).
London, Phillips, 1806, vol. 1, p. iv. For Benjamin 13 G E Berrios, 'Obsessional disorders during the
Rush see Richard Hunter, Ida Macalpine, Three nineteenth century: terminological and classificatory
hundredyears ofpsychiatry, 1535-1860, Hartsdale, issues', in W F Bynum, Roy Porter, Michael
Carlisle Publ., 1982, p. 665. Shepherd (eds), The anatomy ofmadness, 3 vols,
11 For Esquirol see Jan Goldstein, Console and vols 1 and 2: London, Tavistock; vol. 3: London,
classify: the Frenchpsychiatricprofession in the Routledge, 1985-88, vol. 1, p. 170.
nineteenth century, Cambridge University Press, 14 J E D Esquirol, 'Monomanie', in idem, Des
1987, passim; G Swain, Le Sujet de lafolie, maladies mentales consid're6es sous les rapports
Toulouse, Privat, 1977. medical, hygie'nique etme'dico-legal, 2 vols, Paris,
12 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 15. In 1831, J B Bailliere, 1838, vol. 2, p. 5.
Prichard paid a visit to Esquirol at his hospital at Ivry 15 Pri6hard; op. cit., note 5 above, p. 114.
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Prichard voted Tory. He adhered to notions of paternalism that he considered to be
under threat from political radicalism and economic utilitarianism. His cosmos was
thoroughly divided. There was the religious sphere which was horizontally organized, all
men being equal in the eyes ofGod; and there was the world ofmen which was vertically
structured, consisting of hierarchies whose existence-as the French Revolution had
proved-was vital for political coherence as well as the persistence ofreligion.16
This short profile ofPrichard appears at odds with his formulation of a theory like that
of moral insanity which smacked of novelty and whose nosology, as will be explained,
came dangerously close to the tenets ofF J V Broussais who was derided as a materialist.
That Prichard should have devised such a theory is all the more surprising since certain
aspects of it seemingly contradicted his own earlier work. In 1822, he had published a
Treatise on diseases ofthe nervous system, in many respects a conventional account of
insanity, devised along the lines of the Lockean notion that a madman had lost his wits,
but not his soul.17 It fulfilled two purposes. First, Prichard used it to refute the popular,
non-medical idea that the soul or mind itselfcould be diseased. Second, he employed it to
defend religion against materialists who located madness in the brain andreduced the soul
to a function of the brain. Against both of these notions Prichard pitted the idea that
insanity consisted in a faulty transmission ofdata from the brain into the mind. Madness,
in other words, arose from some organic malfunctioning either in the brain or in the
nervous system more generally. The brain was not the organ ofmind but the intermediary
between the body and the immaterial reasoning powers. How the brain related to the
reasoning faculty, Prichard thought to be a medical mystery which man was not given to
penetrate.'8 All he knew for sure was that madness was seated in the nervous system,
whereas the mind was "in no wise involved in the calamity".'9 But owing to some
mechanico-chemical disorder in the nervous system the mind was led to take for
"memory" whatin factwas merely "reverie", sothat its reasoning operations subsequently
went amiss.20 By putting forward this explanation, Prichard saw himself as following in
the tradition of William Cullen, a teacher of James Gregory whose courses on medical
practice Prichard had attended atEdinburgh.21 Indeed, the highest medical authorities had
16 For Prichard's biography see the entry under his
name in Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary
ofscientific biography, New York, Charles
Scribner's Sons, 16 vols, 1970-1980, vol. 11, pp.
136-8; George W Stocking Jr, 'From chronology to
ethnology: James Cowles Prichard and British
anthropology, 1800-1850', in J C Prichard,
Researches into thephysical history ofman, ed. G W
Stocking, University ofChicago Press, 1973; John
Addington Symonds, Some account ofthe life,
writings, and character ofthe late James Cowles
Prichard, Bristol, Evans & Abbott, 1849; G E
Weare, James Cowles Prichard (physician and
ethnologist, 1781 [sic]-1848). A briefretrospect,
reprinted from Bristol Times and Mirror, 1898.
17 John Locke, An essay concerning human
understanding, ed. John Yolton, London, Everyman,
1961, bk. II, p. xxxiii. For the prevalence ofthe
Lockean definition in the eighteenth century see Roy
Porter, Mind-forg'd manacles: a history ofmadness
in Englandfrom the Restoration to the Regency,
London, Penguin Books, 1990.
18 J C Prichard, A treatise on diseases ofthe
nervous system: part thefirst, comprising convulsive
and maniacal affections, London, Thomas and
George Underwood, 1822, pp. 42-3. (The fact that
the second volume never appeared is indicative of
Prichard's changed attitudes towards insanity.)
19 Ibid., p. 119 (Prichard's emphasis). Following
common-sense philosophy, Prichard divided the
mental faculties intojudgement and reasoning on the
one hand and the passions, appetites, propensities,
and volition on the other hand. Pages 1-40 ofhis
treatise are devoted to proving why these innate
mental faculties can be affected by disorders ofthe
nervous system such as madness only in so far as the
bodily framework is instrumentally important for the
operation of the mind.
20 Ibid., pp. 37-8, 128-32.
21 Ibid., p. 128.
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sanctioned the doctrine. The Tukes had used it as the basis of their maxims on moral
treatment.22 It was the standard definition in British legal practice.23 There was no
obvious reason for Prichard to give it up.
None the less, in the mid-thirties, we find him stating in A treatise on insanity that the
traditional account ofmadness was not sufficient; Locke's theory was "by fartoo limited".
The formula "reasoning correctly from erroneous premises" was applicable to certain
forms of insanity only, namely to all those in which the understanding was out of order.
But there existed another type of madness to which Locke's definition did not apply.24 It
consisted in the perversion ofthe emotive faculties, such as the sense of self-preservation
ornatural affection forone'srelatives. In 1822, Prichard had stipulated thatthese, together
with the reasoning power, were beyond physical illness since they were innate attributes
of the immaterial mind. In 1835, they were still faculties of the mind of an immaterial
nature, but, Prichard declared, they could be diseased.25 Materialistic as that sounds,
Prichard was far from resigning himself to physicalism. Why then, it must be asked, did
Prichard depart from received medical doctrines?
Prichard's Opposition to Materialist Philosophy
My suggestion is that both the 1822 and the 1835 treatises had the same target. They
were attempts by Prichard to attack materialistic physiology, most notably phrenology.
Craniology-as it was also called-was, for him, something akin to the application of
Priestley's materialism to the philosophy of mind.26 Between 1810 and 1819, Franz
Joseph Gall andJohann CasparSpurzheim hadpublishedfivebig volumes on the anatomy
andfunctions ofthebrain.27 Inthis multi-volume insult to Prichard's world view, Gall and
Spurzheim divided the brain into numerous distinct "organs", each of which was
responsible for aparticular mental faculty. The respective size ofthese organs was visible
from the outside: the skull displayed protuberances in those places where certain faculties
were especially well developed. The soul, in other words, had its place in the brain.28 The
innermost nature ofman was evident to everybody who only knew how to read the signs,
22Cf. Roy Porter, op. cit, note 17 above, pp. 192,
276. As to the survival ofLocke's theory in general
see chs 2 and 4.
23 Cf. German E Berrios, 'Delusions as "wrong
beliefs": a conceptual history', Br. J. Psychiatry,
suppl. 14, 1991, 159: 6-13, on pp. 7, 9. According to
Roger Smith, thejuridical definition for insanity did
not change from the eighteenth to the nineteenth
century, see Smith, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 14-15.
24 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 3-4.
25 Ibid., pp. 6, 11. Prichard talks about
"disordered" or "disturbed" faculties.
26 Idem, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 50-5.
27 Franz Joseph Gall, Gaspar [sic] Spurzheim,
Anatomie etphysiologie du systeme nerveux en
ge'ne'ral, et du cerveau enparticulier, avec des
observations sur lapossibilite de reconnottre
plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de
1'homme et des animaux, par la configuration de
leurs tates, 5 vols, Paris, printed by F Schoell for the
Bibliotheque Grecque-Latine-Allemande, 1810-19
(vols 1 and 2 were writtenjointly by Gall and
Spurzheim, the remaining vols were published solely
under Gall's name).
28 Notions ofthe soul and the mind were not
entirely congruent. But when it came to criticizing
the phrenologists and other anatomists' endeavours
to locate the soul within parts ofthe brain, the critics
did not neatly distinguish between the two. Oehler-
Klein has emphasized that Gall tried to eschew the
materialist epitheton; see Sigrid Oehler-Klein, Die
Schadellehre Franz Joseph Galls in Literatur und
Kritik des 19. Jahrhunderts, Soemmerring
Forschungen, Bd. 8, Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 1990,
pp. 106-14. For the varying treatments of the mind
and the soul see Edwin Clarke and L S Jacyna,
Nineteenth-century origins ofneuroscientific
concepts, Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press,
1987.
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i.e. the bumps. Throughout his life Prichard railed against this theory,29 but over time he
was to change his arguments.
At Edinburgh University, Prichard had become acquainted with the common-sense
philosophy ofDugald Stewart and Thomas Reid. Its tenets were readily reconcilable with
Christian theology. Diametrically opposed to these doctrines and yet structurally very
similar were the ideas of Gall and Spurzheim. Both systems presupposed certain innate
faculties: a moral sense, natural affections, the power ofunderstanding, etc. But while the
common-sense philosophers referred these to the immaterial mind, the phrenologists, in
locating them in the brain, underlined their material nature. This notion was tied to Gall's
inference "thatthe moral and intellectual world ofman begins where the brainbegins, and
that it ends where the brain ends". This theory appeared to Prichard all the more
pernicious as Gall doubted the perfectibility of human morals. If people could fall back
into ignorance and barbarism, this was, for Gall, due to the physical limits which their
brains posed to the development ofthe moral faculties.30
Prichard's Treatise on diseases ofthe nervous system aimed atrefuting the central tenets
of phrenology, including what he perceived as a debasement of humanity. He strove to
show (1) that the supreme faculties of the mind were independent of the bodily
constitution;31 (2) that for the exercise of the lower faculties of perception and sensation
(i.e. those which could be perturbed) the entire nervous system was at least as important
as the brain itself;32 and (3) that some forms of madness, such as epilepsy, were-"in
some unknown way"-ultimately referable to an "irritated portion of the stomach or
intestines" or "disease in the liver, and other abdominal viscera"-and therefore not to
some lesion of the cerebral structure.33 His tactic was to discount the role of the brain
alone, playing down its significance formental processes, whether in sickness orin health.
It was an approach which Prichard never forsook. The problem was, however, that the
main hypothesis of the 1822 book could not be sustained. It became increasingly
impossible to assert that mental processes were independent of the particular
conformation of the brain, for, during the 1820s, a rising number of pathological
anatomists attributed insanity to lesi6ns of specific parts of the brain. The results of
experimental physiologists, who manipulated thebrain structures in animals, made it more
and more difficult to deny that mental functions were dependent on the cerebral
structure.34
29 Prichard's anti-phrenological stance has been be the organ of sensation and perception, no
pointed out by William F Bynum, 'Time's Noblest physiologist has yet contended, or will ever, I
Offspring: the problem of man in the British natural presume, venture to dispute, that some portion ofthe
historical sciences, 1800-1863', PhD thesis, nervous system is instrumental to these operations".
University ofCambridge, 1974, pp. 215-22. See also 33 Ibid., pp. 242, 323.
Roger Cooter, The cultural meaning ofpopular 34 For the development of neurological anatomy
science: phrenology and the organization ofconsent see W F Bynum, 'Varieties of Cartesian experience
in nineteenth-century Britain, Cambridge University in early nineteenth-century neurophysiology', in S F
Press, 1984, pp. 46, 377 (n. 4). Spicker, H T Engelhardt, Jr (eds), Philosophical
30 Gall and Spurzheim, op. cit., note 27 above, dimensions ofthe neuro-medical sciences, Dordrecht,
vol. 4 (1818), p. 256. D Reidel, 1976; see also Clarke and Jacyna, op. cit.,
31 See note 19 above. note 28 above. For the French context Goldstein is
32 Prichard, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 13. Prichard excellent, op. cit., note 11 above.
wrote: ". . . whether the brain is allowed, or not, to
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The question which engaged many mad-doctors was whether insanity was regularly
accompanied by a physical lesion ofthe brain. Until 1820, it was commonly assumed that
in many cases of madness, there were no lesions to be discovered. Implicitly, this view
bolstered the notion that the brain was not the organ of mind. But in the 1820s the tide
changed, the "seekers after the 'sick organs"' gained in confidence. Especially among
French medical men, lack ofpathological evidence was taken as aproofofthe immaturity
of pathological techniques rather than as a fact.35 Prichard considered the writings of
Esquirol's prot6ge Etienne-Jean Georget as decisive. Georget asserted that insanity was an
idiopathic disease ofthe cerebral structure. His publication on insanity in 182336 inspired,
as Prichard put it, "minute and laborious researches into the morbid changes connected
with this disease".37 But Georget held many tenets which Prichard scorned. He was a
fervent adherent of Gall's craniology, he was regarded as the spearhead of French liberal
medical theory, and he "openly professed materialism".38 But since his opinions were
accepted within the influential Esquirol circle, Prichard had to come to terms with the new
emphasis on pathological and anatomical evidence. Even under the tutelage of the
conservative Esquirol,39 French physiology and anatomy were permeated by views which,
in England, were likely to be seen as verging on materialism. Esquirol himselfdenounced
the "rash pretensions of those who assume that they can fix upon the diseased portion of
the brain".40 But this did not prevent his pupils from pursuing the path which Gall and
Spurzheim had delineated. If only some of their findings were true, then what happened
to the mind? What was left ofthe inviolable soul, the divine spirit in man?
The Temptations ofGerman Romanticism
In the 1820s, in the course ofcontemplating the nature ofmadness and the make-up of
the mental faculties, Prichard came across a medical approach which spelled out many of
his own implicit assumptions about the cultural meaning of madness and which helped
him to come to terms with the notion that mental faculties could be diseased like any other
part ofthe body. It was a form ofsomatic pathology which would not-like that ofGall-
regard the functions of the soul as congruent with the structure of the brain. It relieved
Prichard ofthe problem ofhow toreconcile medicine with metaphysics. The crucial belief
was a form ofemotional insanity which was by definition not accompanied by a lesion of
the cerebral structure. The notion came from Germany, from what Prichard referred to as
"the school of Nasse".41 The doctrines of this group were derived from the Idealist
philosophy of mind. Unlike the theory of "mania without delusion" which Philippe Pinel
(1746-1826) had applied to raving maniacs who, before and after their fits, displayed no
35 Goldstein, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 253. 39Drner has given a lucid description of the
36 Etienne-Jean Georget, De lafolie ou alienation relation between Esquirol's social background and
mentale, Paris, Rignoux, 1823. his theory. Klaus Domer, Burger undIrre, Frankfurt,
37 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 214. Syndikat/EVA, 1984, 2nd rev. ed., pp. 153-67.
38 The quote is from Georget himself, cited in 40 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 213, (his
Goldstein, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 256. According translation).
to Goldstein the influence of Gall "was pervasive" 41 Idem, 'Observations on the connexions of
among the members ofthe Esquirol circle, ibid., insanity with diseases in the organs ofphysical life',
pp. 179-80, 256. As for Georget's phrenological Prov. med. surg. J., 1844, 7: 323-4, on p. 323.
stance see Georget, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 47.
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delusive convictions,42 that of the Nasse school addressed a wider range of emotional
disorders that comprised not only states of "exalted mania", but all possible sorts of
emotional aberration, ranged on a scale from excess to depression. It was to become the
core of moral insanity.
From the last third of the eighteenth century, the Germans had been debating the
relationship between body and soul, with respect to anthropology as well as to physics.43
By the 1820s there were two opposing factions who quarrelled passionately with each
other: the somatists ofthe Nasse school, and the psychicists underthe theoretical guidance
of Johann Christian August Heinroth (1773-1843). German medical theory, unlike
French, was slow to enter Britain.44 When the English finally got round to reading the
Germans, they picked out whatthey needed, irrespective ofwhetherthey were combining
notions which in Germany belonged to separate schools. In this, Prichard was no
exception, and his sympathy for certain parts ofHeinroth's doctrines did not prevent him
from cherishing tenets ofthe Nasse school as well.
It is well known that conservative British men of letters such as Carlyle and Coleridge
found in German Romanticism the depth of religiosity and feeling which they felt was
lacking in their own culture. Prichard too turned to German learning and German piety.
His scientific ethos required him to express his theories without having recourse to
theological arguments. It was an attitude which applied not only to his ideas on madness
but also to his anthropological and philological writings.45 None the less, he had great
sympathy for scholarly texts whose authors were less conscious about the conflation of
theology and science. In this respect, German Romantic medical theories served as a
legitimation ofhis own opinions.
Christian Friedrich Nasse, Maximilian Jacobi, Franz Francke and a few other Germans
had as their mouthpiece a periodical edited by Nasse, initially called Zeitschrift fur
psychischeArzte, later on ZeitschriftfiirAnthropologie. Published in Leipzig from 1818,
it was reckoned the first high-quality periodical on insanity to be set up in Germany.46 In
1824, thejoumnal included an excerpt from Prichard's book on nervous disorders.47 It was
42 Philippe Pinel, A treatise on insanity, trans.
D D Davis, Sheffield, Cadell and Davies, 1806.
43 As to the usage ofanthropology in the life
sciences ofthe eighteenth and nineteenth centuries see
Mareta Linden, Untersuchungen zum
Anthropologiebegriffdes 18. Jahrhunderts, Bern,
Herbert Lang, 1976. For accounts ofGerman
psychiatry see Erwin Ackerknecht, Kurze Geschichte
derPsychiatrie, 3rd improved ed., Stuttgart, Enke,
1985; Dorner, op. cit., note 39 above. A concise
overview as well as furtherreferences to monographs
on German psychiatry are to be found in Otto M
Marx, 'The beginning ofpsychiatric historiography in
nineteenth-century Germany', in Mark S Micale, Roy
Porter (eds), Discovering the history ofpsychiatry,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. For
German therapeutics see idem, 'German Romantic
psychiatry: Part 1', Hist. Psychiatry, 1990, 1: 351-80;
idem, 'German Romantic psychiatry: Part 2', ibid.,
1991, 2: 1-26; GerlofVerwey, Psychiatry in an
anthropological andbiomedical context:philosophical
presuppositions and implications ofGennan
psychiatry, 1820-1870, Dordrecht, D Reidel, 1984.
44 Hunter and Macalpine, op. cit., note 10 above,
p. 1014.
45 For a more extensive treatment ofthis subject
see my PhD thesis: 'James C. Pritchard's views of
man. An anthopologist between the Enlightenment
and the Victorian age', University ofLondon, 1996.
46 The American alienist Pliny Earle saw it as the
first Germanjournal on insanity of some standing.
"The influence ofthe Journal was", as Earle put it,
"favourable to the cause ofthe insane, as it" inter
alia "awakened in its readers . . . an interest in the
improvement ofhospitals"; see Pliny Earle,
Institutionsfor the insane in Prussia, Austria and
Germany, New York, Wood, 1854, pp. 5-16, 19-26,
28-9, quote from Hunter and Macalpine, op. cit.,
note 10 above, p. 1015.
47 Prichard, 'Beobachtungen uber die Beziehung
des Gecdchtnisses zum Gehirn', Zeitschriftfurdie
Anthropologie, 1824, 7: 243-50.
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then, at the latest, that he became acquainted with these particular German theories of
madness. Indeed, Prichard's footnotes in his 1835 treatise on insanity reveal that he paid
a lot of attention to the Zeitschrift and the articles of one of its most eminent editors,
Maximilian Jacobi.48
Deeply involved in Romantic philosophizing, the contributors ofthe Zeitschrift tried to
defend what they perceived as real and inner human values against superficial French
rationality. Practising in Halle and Bonn, Nasse (1778-1851) was a pupil of Johann
Christian Reil.49 Jacobi (1755-1858) was the son of a famous philosopher who had been
a companion of Goethe.50 Their politics of the body bolstered the notion of a holistic
interplay between all parts ofthe body and the soul, while at the same time, they believed
in a distinct hierarchy in which the soul was constantly at odds with the flesh. When the
body took over, the state ofhealth as well as the morality ofthe individual was in danger.
Nasse, Jacobi, and a Dresden doctor called Franz Francke (1796-1837) propounded the
idea that there existed a form of mental dislocation which was caused by diseases of the
visceral organs and which expressed itself solely in a derangement of the emotions.
Starting from the position of Cartesian dualism, turning himself against Stahl's animism
and Heinroth's exuberant idealism as well as the psychical materialism which many
zealous anatomists proposed,5' Francke asserted, in 1824, what Prichard had suggested
two years earlier, namely that madness was "a sympathetic disease of the brain" whose
original source was an organic disease in the viscera. He said, "The essence, the natural
cause of psychical disease resides in the body",52 and expressly turned against those
pathologists for whom anatomical evidence ofbrain disorder was a guide to the seat and
nature of the disease.53 Nasse mocked "the doctrine, repeated in all physiological text-
books, that the soul must have a distinct seat somewhere in the body". He saw the entire
living body as a unity, and hence madness affected the whole of man's physical
appearance.54 It may be, Jacobi wrote, that the manifestations ofthe reasoning faculty are
almost fully intact, and "none the less there is mental disturbance". For, "this or that side
of the emotional life may be affected" by some disease of "certain parts of the
organism".55 These views are so nearly allied to the theory of moral insanity that it
appears quite likely that the German texts left their trace in Prichard's mind.
48 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 32, 116-17,
138, 169, 178, 184, 194-98, 237-42, 248.
49 For biographical details ofNasse see Werner
von Noorden, Der Kliniker Christian Friedrich
Nasse 1778-1851, Jena, G Fischer, 1929.
50 ForJacobi's theory see D6rner, op. cit., note 39
above, pp. 270 ff; Verwey, op. cit., note 43 above,
pp. 27-30. Biographical data can be found in the
otherwise totally unacceptable work by Johannes
Herting, Carl WigandMaximilian Jacobi, ein
deutscherArzt (1755-1858): Ein Lebensbild nach
Brie en undanderen Quellen, Gorlitz, Starke, 1930.
5' Franz Francke, 'Ueber den Antheil des Korpers
an Erzeugung psychischer Krankheitszustiinde',
ZeitschriftfurdieAnthropologie, 1824, 7: 257-338,
on pp. 264, 268.
52 Ibid., pp. 330-1, 289.
53 Ibid., p. 259.
54 C F Nasse, 'Von der psychischen Beziehung
des Herzens', ZeitschriftfurpsychischeArzte, 1818,
1: 49-116, on pp. 73-4.
55 Maximilian Jacobi, 'Beobachtungen uber die
Pathologie und Therapie der mit Irreseyn
verbundenen Krankheiten', in idem, Sammlungenfiur
die Heilkunde der Gemuthskrankheiten, Elberfeld,
Schonian'sche Buchhandlung, 3 vols, 1830, vol. 3,
p. 359; cf. also, ibid., vol. 1, pp. 43-5. The
Sammlungen combined three ofJacobi's texts from
1822, 1825, and 1830. His main work dated from
1830, though, as Dorner notes, the cornerstones of
Jacobi's theory were already developed in 1822, op.
cit., note 39 above, p. 277.
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Humoralism versus Phrenological Materialism
Thatthe viscera could lie at the roots ofmadness Prichard had already said in 1822. But
then, he had seen the emotions and the understanding as mental faculties which were
untouchable by organic operations. The Nasse school, too, directed their efforts against
phrenology, but, unlike Prichard, they had no qualms about theorizing on the
interrelationship between body and mind. Jacobi, in particular, criticized the traditional
approach to madness which, in his opinion, had always wrongly focused on the
understanding. For the nosology ofmadness, as he saw it, the emotional framework was
more important than the understanding.56 "The melancholic", Jacobi said, "is not plunged
into his disease by virtue ofthis or that sad idea, rather the idea arises because he suffers
from some such disease". Prichard quoted the phrase approvingly when reporting a case
where he himselfhad acted as the consulting physician.57 According to the Nasse school,
atthe onset ofmost cases ofmadness there existed aderangement ofthe emotions brought
about by a disease in parts of the organism. This could-but need not necessarily-lead
to a deranged understanding.58 While the latter disease was indeed seated in the brain,59
dislocated emotions signified a disease ofthe visceral organs, be it the heart, the liver, the
stomach or a part ofthe intestines.60 Thus the way was paved for the pathology of moral
insanity.
In pitting the diseases ofthe passions against those ofthe intellect, the Germans relied
heavily on the time-honoured doctrine ofhumoralism.61 As a faculty whose functioning
was clearly dependent on the brain, the understanding was open to anatomical
investigations. Not so the passions: their expression was a matter of the body's physical
constitution. Humoralist doctrines were used to theorize and classify them. In Jacobi's
words, the task was to investigate "the temperaments as somatic basis of the affective
powers and the passions".62 While, in 1822, Prichard was not interested in the
temperaments, by the mid-thirties he explicitly applied humoralism to the nosology of
madness.63 In his article on the 'Temperaments' in the Cyclopaedia ofpractical medicine
he relied heavily on German sources, and on Jacobi's publications in particular.64 The
56 Jacobi, ibid., vol. 1, pp. 38, 52.
5 Ibid., p. 44. Quoted in Prichard, op. cit., note 2
above, pp. 29-30.
58 Ibid., p. 43 (". . . und erst nachdem die
Gemuthsstorung zur Wirklichkeit gekomen ist, und
auch die Phantasie . . . erkrankt ist, tritt
Verstandesstorung ein. Dieses Ursprunges sind alle
Hauptformen der Seelenstorungen, die man daher mit
Recht Gemuthskrankheiten nennt . .
59 Ibid., p. 58.
60 Ibid., p. 34 (Jacobi talks about "krankhafte
Wechsel in der Materie und Veranderungen in der
Or anisation").
61 Even though Jacobi asserted that the second
volume ofthe Sammlungen dealt mainly with the
temperaments (ibid., vol. 2, p. vii), this side ofhis
theory has hardly been given any consideration. Only
one historian mentions humoralism in the context:
Edward Hare, 'The history of"nervous disorders"
from 1600 to 1840, and acomparison with modem
views', Br J. Psychiatry, 1991, 159: 37-45, on
pp. 41-2. For general accounts ofhumoralism in the
epoch see Antoinette Emch-Deriaz, 'The non-naturals
made easy', in Roy Porter (ed.), Thepopularization of
medicine 165S-1850, London, Routledge, 1992;
William A Lishman, Organicpsychiatry, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1990; Owsei Temkin, Galenism: rise and
decline ofa medicalphilosophy, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 1973, p. 180 ff. In his programmatic
article in the first volume ofthe Zeitschrift, Nasse too
professed his adherence to humoralism. See Nasse,
'Ueber die Benennung und die vorlaufige Eintheilung
des psychischen Krankseyns', Zeitschriftfuir
psychischeArzte, 1818, 1: 1-48, on pp. 39-40.
62 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 1, p. 70.
63 Prichard stressed that "a certain peculiarity of
natural temperament or habit ofbody is a necessary
condition for the development ofinsanity" (op. cit.,
note 2 above, p. 157), he adopted a classification of
madness derived from humoralism (ibid., pp. 168-9).
64 Prichard, 'Temperament', in op. cit., note 1
above, vol: 4, pp. 159-74.
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nineteenth-century version of humoralism did without the notion that any given
temperament was due to the superabundance of a particular bodily fluid. Instead, as
Francke put it, temperament referred simply to "the specific individual constitution of
physico-psychical life".65 This implied, in Jacobi's words, that "there are as many
different temperaments as there are different individuals".66 Prichard expressed himselfin
a similar manner. After having declared that moral insanity referred to the "preternatural
excitement of the temper and spirits", he specified that "in fact, the varieties of moral
insanity are perhaps as numerous as the modifications offeeling or passion in the human
mind".67
In this interpretation, the temperaments were being proffered as indicators of man's
psychological constitution.68 Jacobi contended that "the impact which the brain exerts on
the psyche [was] far less well established" than that ofthe temperaments.69 Humoralism
was used to found abodily system ofemotions which could not be explained by reference
to processes within the brain. The latter was responsible for matters concerning man's
intellect, while the particular humoral constitution of the body determined his moral
conformation. Thus Jacobi mustered humoralism against modern phrenological
materialism.70 The second volume of his Sammlungen was devoted to anthropological
investigations executed along humoralist lines and dedicated to the rejection of
phrenology. Prichard took up the torch: indeed, "the varieties of temperament and the
peculiarities of organization belonging to individuals are so related to predisposition to
mental disease", that he declared himself "anxious to give a brief and distinct statement"
about them. He appended a long 'Supplementary note on peculiar configurations of the
skull' tohis treatise wherehe discussed the matter, in orderto prove thatthe psychological
systems ofthe phrenologists were wrong.71
The Instincts
The emphasis on the humoral doctrine linked up with a reconsideration of the role of
instincts. During the eighteenth century, instincts had been regarded as the base animal
counterpart of divine human rationality. At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
however, their status was remodelled. For Prichard, the work of the physician Thomas
Hancock (1783-1849) was of decisive importance. The two men had studied together at
65 Francke, op. cit., note 51 above, p. 291. 69 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 1, p. 137.
66 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 1, p. 67. 70 Ibid., pp. 64-6. For Jacobi, it was notjust
67 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 17. Roger physiology which determined the psyche. The
Smith has rightly pointed out that this phrase lent mechanism functioned vice versa at least as reliably.
itselfto subsequent misinterpretations ofmoral Prichard must have taken particular interest in
insanity, he does not, however, link Prichard's Jacobi's claim that a change ofreligion led to a
opinion to the humoral tradition, (op. cit., note 6 change ofthe physiology: "Mahometans and
above, p. 114). Christians can be recognized in their bodies. When a
68 In general terms, this interpretation is supported Mahometan turns into a Christian, bodily too he
by S W Jackson, 'Galen on mental disorder', J. Hist. becomes a new man", ibid., vol. 2, p. 327.
Behav. Sci., 1969, 5: 365-84, on p. 382. Jackson 71 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 169-70,
notes that "certain" ofGalen's "views and practices 461-80.
seem to have kinship with modern psychogenic
theories and psychotherapies".
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Edinburgh, and had remained friends ever since.72 Hancock was a Quaker whose
metaphysical earnestness none could doubt. In his Essay on instinct and itsphysical and
moral relations, he rescued the instincts from their low status in brutish nature. Starting
from Thomas Reid's and Dugald Stewart's philosophy, Hancock asserted that instincts
were characteristic of man as well as animals.73 It was wrong to see them as the brute
substitute for human rationality:74 they belonged to that part of the constitution of which
the living creature, human as well as animal, was not consciously aware.75 But although
they were innate, instincts were modifiable. Most notably, domestication led to an
animal's loss ofits natural instincts.76 Hancockdid not see this as altogetherdesirable. Not
only were domesticated animals predisposed to catch new forms of disease, but their
natures could also be altered for the worse. The beaver in the native state was, according
to Hancock, "politic, vigilant, social, labouring incessantly for the public good"; in
captivity, however, all these positive characteristics disappeared.77 The analogy between
animals and man was easily made. Hancock praised the "pure and natural state" of the
human senses while he saw with critical eyes what civilization did to them: "as men, the
more they degenerate, grow the vainer, they come at last to believe that without divine
assistance by their own wisdom merely they may be happy". This statement flowed from
Hancock's beliefthat morality was not a question ofrationality: "Reason does not enable
man to fulfil the ends of his creation", he wrote.78 The divinity had implanted a moral
standard or "spiritual principle" in the human constitution;79 it formed part of man's
instinctive fabric.80
Hancock fruitfully combined strong religious belief, the philosophy of the human
mind, post-revolutionary Rousseauist criticism and the Romantic scepticism towards
rationality. Prichard more than once mentioned the book at crucial points in his analyses,
and it helped him to envision insanity as part of the human condition.81 Prichard's
72 John Addington Symonds, 'Some account of
the life, writings, and character ofthe late James
Cowles Prichard', in idem, Miscellanies, London,
Macmillan, 1871, on p. 117. Born in Ireland,
Hancock studied medicine at Dublin and Edinburgh,
where he graduated in 1806. After he had spent
twenty years as a physician to the City ofLondon
and Finsbury Dispensaries he moved to Liverpool
and finally back to Ireland. During his London years
he acquired a reputation as a writer on medical
subjects (with articles on epidemics, fever, and
contagious diseases) and as having a philosophic
mind. With regard to the doctrine ofrevelation,
Hancock tried to reconcile Locke's philosophy ofthe
human mind with common-sense philosophy. His
obituary stressed that "his works evince throughout
them a tone ofreligious sentiment, well harmonizing
with the author's deportment in life"; (see his
obituary in London Medical Gazette, 1849, 8: 790;
and Dictionary ofnational biography, vol. 24).
73 Thomas Hancock, Essay on instinct and its
physical and moral relations, London, W Phillips, et
al., 1824, pp. 52-101.
74 In his translation ofBuffon's Natural history,
Smellie had made this point. Afterwards many
conservative-minded naturalists refuted the idea. See,
e.g., H C Trenchard, 'On the distinction between
instinct and reason', Bath andBristol Magazine,
1834, 3: 147-55. See also Hancock, op. cit., note 73
above, pp. 11-13.
75 See ibid., ch. 6, 'The ascending scale of
instinctive or unconscious motions', p. 112 ff.
76 Ibid., p. 109.
77 Ibid., pp. 55, 59.
78 Ibid., pp. 192, 173.
79 Ibid., p. 315 and ch. 9 'Ofthe divine spirit in
the soul'.
80 Ibid., p. 196 and Part II 'Ofthe moral relations
ofinstinct', p. 197 ff.
81 J C Prichard, A review ofthe doctrine ofa vital
principle, as maintained by some writers on
physiology with observations on the causes of
physical & animal life, London, John and Arthur
Arch, 1829, p. 63 ("the relations which the faculties
ofbrutes bear to those of man have been admirably
illustrated by Dr. Hancock, in his Essay on Instinct");
idem, Researches into thephysical history ofman,
5 vols, London, Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper,
1836-47, vol. 1, on. p. 174; idem, op. cit., note 2
above, p. 189; Prichard quoted a title with a slightly
different wording from Hancock's original. Since, as
far as I know, Hancock published on the subject only
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elaborate system of exciting and predisposing causes of madness fitted neatly with the
modernized form of humoralism and Hancock's Essay on instinct. As for the exciting
causes, Prichard distinguished between moral and physical causes. To the former he
ascribed much greater impact: "a more decided preponderance will appear on the side of
moral causes as the principal agents concerned in the development ofmental disorders".82
But irrespective of the nature of the "accidental excitements", madness could break out
only if the exciting causes met with a bodily predisposition to madness:
A certain peculiarity of natural temperament or habit of body is a necessary condition for the
development ofinsanity: without the previous existence of this condition the causes which give rise
to the disease will either act upon the individual without any noxious effect, or they will call forth
some other train of morbid phenomena.83
This medical distinction between predisposing and exciting causes-standard
knowledge-had an important role within Prichard's theory, for he added that the
predisposition to insanity was part of human nature. Referring to Hancock, Prichard
declared: "it may be said in one sense that a preparation is made for this species of
derangement [madness] in the constitution ofthe human mind".84
Prichard came to this conclusion through extending Hancock's hypothesis on the loss
of animal instincts under the conditions of domestication to human cultures of varying
degrees ofcivilization. He held the widespread notion that with the increasing refinement
of society madness was increasing also. Hancock helped him to account for that
phenomenon in a manner which would not call in question the perfection of creation. A
propensity to madness was nothing less than a necessary corollary of the human ability to
survive. While in animals the sense of self-preservation operated unconsciously or
instinctively, human nature was endowed with the faculty of foresight- "Hope and fear,
anxiety respecting the future, are the principles in human nature by which the care ofself-
preservation is insured".85 Hope, fear, and anxiety were deeply ingrained in the human
psyche, they were inherent to man's nature and hence beyond the control ofrationality.
This theory had a desirable side-effect. Etienne de Condillac and his followers thought
that animal instincts were reducible to habit and experience. So, to do the opposite and
bolster the role ofthe instincts as part of the body's constitution as a whole amounted to a
refutation of sensationalism and its derivative schools. Thanks to Hancock, Prichard was
able to appreciate theories which emphasized the significance ofmadness as aphenomenon
ofthe body's essential make-up. It was a crucial spur to Prichard's growing interest in the
psychological nature of man as understood by German anthropologists and alienists.
German Influence on Prichard
Prichard was not the only mad-doctor to discover the significance of German theories
on madness. Before him, Philippe Pinel, taking the same course, had also arrived at the
notion of emotional disorders.86 But in Britain Prichard was the first to utilize the full
the above mentioned book, it is unlikely that 83 Ibid., p. 157.
Prichard had in mind a publication other than 84 Ibid., p. 189.
Hancock's Essay. 85 Ibid., pp. 350, 189.
82 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 174. 86 Pinel, op. cit., note 42 above.
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potential of the German approach.87 German theories of the human mind as well as of
madness were native to German intellectual traditions. To some extent this was aquestion
of language: the German word Gemiut has no exact equivalent in English. Prichard
translated it as "sentiment", but Gemut is more than that. It refers to the emotional
disposition or the moral framework of man, and relates to the understanding, as heart
relates to brain. Hence German semantics suggested a classification of madness which
naturally included the notion of diseased emotions. It enabled Prichard to regard the
passions as ontologically distinct from the other faculties ofthe mind.88
While Prichard referred the passions and the understanding to the realm of physical
materiality, there was one faculty which was exempt. Following the German distinction
between the mental faculties, Prichard conceived not only the complementary duality of
sentiment andunderstanding, but also added athirdprinciple,judgement, the English term
for Vernunft. Unlike the powers of sentiment and understanding, this third component of
German idealist philosophy remained the link between man's mind and God's spirit. In
English, understanding, reasoning and judgement are not always clearly distinguished.
Prichard, too, confused them. In German, by contrast, due not least to Immanuel Kant, the
terms Vernunft and Verstand are endowed with different meanings.89 In 1835, Prichard
surrendered to physical causes both the emotions and the understanding, i.e. "the
intellectual" and "the ethical or moral department of the mind": both might be perverted
by external impressions, whether ofa moral or a physical nature.90 But Prichard believed
that the faculty ofjudgement was in a certain way removed from the influence ofexternal
stimuli: "The individual can reason soundly on all subjects, only he can never be brought
to doubt or to exercise his faculty ofjudging and reasoning on the subject of this false
impression."91 As in 1822, he argued thatthis faculty was only mediately connectedto the
external world. He referred to the recent publications ofthe French philosopher Pierre La
Romiguiere who, employing Kant's philosophy, had asserted the independence of the
faculty ofjudgement from the operations of the senses.92 The notion that thejudgement
could judge everything except itself was a characteristic element of German idealist
philosophy. Starting with the Lancet in 1835, commentators tended to believe that moral
87 Weiner mentions that Crichton too was an avid
student ofGerman texts. But much as Crichton
emphasized the role ofthe passions for the rise of
insanity, he did not perceive that the passions
themselves might be diseased; see Dora Weiner,
'Mind and body in the clinic: Philippe Pinel,
Alexander Crichton, Dominique Esquirol, and the
birth ofpsychiatry', in George S Rousseau (ed.), The
languages ofpsyche: mind andbody in
Enlightenment thought, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1990, esp. pp. 334-6. Cf. Alexander
Crichton, An inquiry into the nature andorigin of
mental derangement, comprehending a concise
system ofthephysiology andpathology ofthe human
mind and a history ofthepassions and theireffects,
2 vols, London, T Cadell Jr and W Davies, 1798,
vol. 2, bk. 3, 'On the passions and their effects'.
88 Traditional British nosology was based on the
differentiation between the "active" and the
"intellectual" powers ofmind (cf. Roger Smith, op.
cit, note 6 above, p. 38). But as Prichard's 1822
Treatise illustrates, this division introduced no
genuine differentiation in the analytical treatment of
the two. Spurzheim was one ofthe first to assign two
different seats-both ofthem, ofcourse, situated in
the brain-to the emotive and the intellectual
faculties respectively; cf. Oehler-Klein, op. cit., note
28 above, p. 330.
89 For a contemporary English account ofKant's
terminology see the glossary in A F M Willich,
Elements ofthe criticalphilosophy; containing a
concise account ofits origin and tendency; a view of
all the workspublished by itsfounder, Professor
Immanuel Kant-.. ,London, Longman, 1798.
90 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 10.
91 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 120.
92 In his time, La Romiguiere was interpreted in
very diverse ways. Prichard learnt about his theories
through the Belgian alienist Joseph Guislain, cf.
Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 118-19.
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insanity was developed merely within the framework of common-sense philosophy.93
This, however, is at best half the truth. It was only by virtue of the German idealist
philosophy ofmind which assignedjudgement its special cognitive position, that Prichard
could accept the notion of unbalanced mental faculties such as perverted emotions and
deranged understanding, without consigning the soul to the realm ofphysical causation.94
And this in turn enabled him to associate the emotions with the bodily constitution,
whence he derived a theory of psychical disorder which was designed to defy the
phrenological system.
Hitherto, many historians have regarded the intellectual struggles over the relationship
between the body and the mind in the 1820s and 1830s mainly as a binary opposition
between two camps: the physicalists or somatists versus the spiritualists-as they are
called in France-or the mentalists as they are referred to in England.95 Indeed,
Maximilian Jacobi was in his time the spearhead of the somatists who attributed the
aetiology of mental diseases exclusively to the body, and he was deeply embroiled in
quarrels with the rival faction ofthe psychicists, represented by Heinroth. However, their
skirmishes must not be translated into the handy dichotomy between "materialist"
somatists and "pious" psychicists. As Verwey has rightly stressed, the quarrels between
the two factions did not amount to the simple antagonism between body-centred and
mind-centred explanations for insanity. It is true that they argued with each other over
whether the aetiology ofmental diseases should be placed in the body or in the soul. This
difference was mirrored in their politics: the Somatists tended towards liberalism, while
the followers ofHeinroth harboured a more conservative outlook which led them to view
mental disorder as a product of immorality.96 But they all spoke as one when it came to
fighting "the one-sided, physically-oriented, 'mind-less' medicine of the Aufklarungs
1,, 97 era
In the desire to leave the realm of the immaterial soul untainted by physicalist theory,
the Nasse school applied, as it were, the mind-body dualism to the relationship between
parts of the body itself. While materialist physiology had chosen the brain as its
stronghold, the somatists focused on the rest of the body as the realm which was
93 An anonymous reviewer ofthe Treatise on
insanity wrote: "Let Dr. Prichard, however, confess
that nearly all this new light on the subject ofmoral
insanity has burst on M. Esquirol, on himself, and on
the Scotch metaphysical school, since the appearance
ofGall's immortal work on the anatomy and
functions ofthe brain"; Lancet, 1834-35, ii: 703-5,
on p. 705. See also the references in note 7 above.
94 A good treatment of Kant's role in the German
alienist tradition is in Domer, op. cit., note 39 above,
pp. 185-328. For the impact of Kant's philosophy on
the natural sciences see Frederick Gregory, 'Kant's
influence on natural scientists in the German
Romantic period', in Robert Visser, et aL (eds), New
trends in the history ofscience: proceedings ofa
conference held at the University ofUtrecht,
Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1989 pp. 53-66; Guenter Risse,
'Kant, Schelling and the early search for a
philosophical "science" ofmedicine in Germany', J.
Hist. Med., 1972, 27: 145-78; idem, "'Philosophical"
medicine in nineteenth-century Germany: an episode
in the relation between philosophy and medicine', J.
Med. Philos., 1976, 1: 72-91.
95 See, e.g., Domer, op. cit., note 39 above, p.
266; Goldstein, op. cit., note 11 above, pp. 247, 249,
257; Scull, The most solitary ofafflictions, op. cit.,
note 9 above, pp. 216-31; Smith, op. cit., note 6
above, p. 40 ff.
96 Donmer has emphasized the liberal politics of
the "somatic school" among German alienists some
of whom indeed came to sit in the parliament ofthe
Paulskirche in 1848. He does not, however, give
their religious ethics its due; Dorner, op. cit., note 39
above, pp. 273-9.
97 Verwey, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 8. Jacyna too
has pointed out that thejuxtaposition of "moral"
theories ofinsanity and a physicalist aetiology is
"over-simple", L S Jacyna, 'Somatic theories of
mind and the interests ofmedicine in Britain,
1850-1879', Med. Hist., 1982, 26: 233-58, p. 233.
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expressive of, and governed by, forces which were neither rational nor even connected to
the organ of rationality. But they were not materialists. In the end the very notion of an
organism whose parts, through the mechanism ofsympathy, were all linked to each other
as well as to the soul, contradicts this interpretation. Jacobi's insistence on physical
sources of madness did not aim to reduce the operations of the mind to physical causes.
Ratherhe was defying the attempts ofPinel and Heinroth to explain all mental phenomena
through occurrences of which the individual was conscious or could at least give an
account. He rejected Heinroth's emphasis that madness was the outcome of sin. And he
poked fun at Pinel's assumption that a madman himself might be able to explain what
plunged his mind into disorder.98 Pinel too regarded inflammation of the viscera as a
source of mental disorder.99 But in Jacobi's opinion, Pinel had made a bad choice when
he rejected the diagnostic system of humoralism in favour of the practice of asking his
patients whether they had experienced "distress or misfortunes".10 This was a naive and
ludicrous approach to diagnosis: "Who has not experienced distress or misfortunes?",
Jacobi asked rhetorically.'0' If madness struck, it was the result of the disposition and
constitution ofthe individual, not ofproblems which were part ofhuman life.
Despite opposing this psychological approach to diagnosis, Jacobi was not against
psychological explanations in general. But for him, that part ofman's mental framework
which was open to medical treatment was mediated through the bodily constitution. After
all it was here where sentiments made themselves felt: anxiety infested the stomach,
sadness infected the heart; here "madness lights up the candles which create the illusions
that lead the understanding into the wrong".102 In the theories of the somatists,
physiological tenets joined with the repertoire of Romantic criticism. To regard madness
primarily as a disease of the viscera was a corollary of the fact that Romanticism
considered the understanding as the poorer, merely instrumental part of the human
character. Accordingly, the brain as the instrument of the understanding was of lower
transcendental value than those organs which were in bilateral intercourse with the
emotions. As Jacobi put it, "the holiest powers of man which constitute his actual value,
his humanity, reside in his sentiment [Gemith]".103 In short, forthe German somatists, the
visceral organization of the body had more to do with the transcendental nature of man
than had the brain, and this was the idea that lay behind Jacobi's quip that "there are
certain morbid changes in the organisation" which ultimately lead to an impairment "of
moral freedom".104
98 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 1, pp. 78-9, ... .; im Herzenschlagt die Melancholie zuerst ihre dem
vol. 2, p. 403. Cf. J C A Heinroth, Lehrbuch der Leben verderblichen Wurzeln" (ibid., vol. 1, p. 43).
Storungen des Seelenlebens oderderSeelenstorungen 103 Ibid.
undihrerBehandlung. Vom rationalen Standpunkt aus 104 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34. Jacobi believed "daB
entworfen, 2Theile, Leipzig, F C W Vogel, 1818. Wechsel und Veranderungen der Materie und
99 Pinel, op. cit., note 42 above, p. 17. Organisation in einem ausserordentlichen Grade statt
100 For Pinel's renunciation ofhumoralist finden konnen, ohne daB die AeuBerung der Freiheit
diagnostics see Dora Weiner, "'Le geste de Pinel": nur im mindesten dadurch beschrankt wird. Aufder
the history of a psychiatric myth', in Mark S Micale, andem Seite lehrt indessen die Erfahrung ebenfalls,
Roy Porter (eds), Discovering the history of daB es gewisse krankhafte Wechsel in der Materie
psychiatry, Oxford University Press, 1994, on p. 235. und Verdnderungen in der Organisation giebt,
101 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 3, p. 93. wiihrend deren Vorhandenseyn die moralische
. . . im Herzen zundet der Wahnsinn die Lichter Freiheit oder das Wirken der Vernunft, durch ein
an, durch welche die Trugbilder entstehen, die den bedingtes Leiden der Gemuths- und Verstandeskrafte
Verstand irre leiten; im Herzen keimt die Narrheit auf gebunden erscheint." (My emphases.)
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So far, the doctrines which Prichard shared with the Nasse school can be summarized
thus:105
(1) They saw insanity as an organic disorder with, quite often, its primary seat in the
viscera and not in the brain.
(2) Theyreferred to amodernized form ofhumoralism to establish amatrix which made
emotions nosologically amenable. This wenttogetherwith a new interest in the systematic
exploration ofhuman psychology. The emergent discipline ofpsychology was intertwined
with anthropology and medicine. Man's psychologicat framework paralleled, on a higher
level, animal instincts. The individual human psyche was the result of the interaction
between the individual (humoral) constitution and the external environment. Hence the
faculties ofrationality and emotions could no longer be regarded as purely spiritual.
(3) Their theories of madness accounted for the perversion of the emotions and the
understanding. In so far as they referred mental faculties to material nature, they advanced
theories akin to materialism. But unlike materialists, they assigned the faculty of
judgement aspecial position: itremained aloof, being principally separated fromthe realm
ofnature.
(4) They consciously formulated theories of madness which reflected their dismay
about contemporary materialistic tendencies. In particular they strove to defy the
phrenological threat through the combined efforts of their anthropological and
physiological endeavours. In general, their scholarship was imbued by the metaphysical
project to validate the transcendental nature of man within the language of science.
Prichard's Conversion to Jacobi's Theory
Although Prichard followed Jacobi's theory in many particulars, in the 1830s he was
not ready to admit a relationship between the concept of moral insanity and Jacobi's
doctrines of the pathology of madness. This was due to the materialistic connotations of
somaticism. Prichard disowned the brain as the seat of the emotive faculties, so that it
could not be taken as the seat ofthe soul.106 However, he was not prepared either to let in
materialism through the back door by admitting that all mental states were ultimately the
result ofbodily conformations. This was what, in the eyes ofmany ofhis contemporaries,
Jacobi's somaticism amounted to. As we have seen, Jacobi was deeply pious. None the
less, many objections to his stance in the physicalist-mentalist debate were raised by
religious critics. Also, his claim that madness was a non-cerebral disorder agreed in some
particulars with the views ofBroussais who was condemned for his materialism. In 1835
Prichard was sceptical of Broussais's attempt to refer insanity to "irritations ... in the
digestive organs", that was "a position which, before it can be idmitted, requires proof;
and no such proofhas been afforded". For the same reason, Prichard denounced Jacobi's
105 In some respects the following catalogue is true 106 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 246,
for Esquirol as well. The basic rift between Prichard "however, probable it may be thought by some
and the Nasse school on the one hand and Esquirol persons that the passions and propensities are seated
on the other lies in Esquirol's "straightforwardly in the brain, or that modifications which the mind
'physiological"' approach, his penchant towards undergoes in respect to these phenomena are
sensationalism and positivisim, and his rejection of connected with instrumental changes in the brain, the
psychology as a discipline, see Goldstein, op. cit., fact has never been proved".
note 11 above, pp. 247, 249, 257.
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nosology as "extreme". At the same time, however, he was intrigued by the idea that
explained mental diseases as a result ofgastro-enteric disorders.107
Another theory which strove to explain madness as a disease ofthe viscera was Pinel's
"manie sans d6lire".108 Like Prichard's moral insanity, it conceived ofa form ofmadness
which did not involve a derangement of the understanding. But unlike Prichard, who
conceived extreme eccentricity as a typical syndrome of moral insanity, Pinel had
characterized "manie sans delire" as a frenzy of the passions, involving great rage and
violence. Prichard could not reconcile himself to the idea that simple disorders in the
bowels could induce "that intense excitement of malevolent propensity which leads to
murder and suicide". 109
In his view, all extreme positions based on ambiguous pathological investigations were
suspect: it was wrong to define madness as a function of cerebral disorder, and equally
mistaken to attribute it merely to the viscera. As a safeguard against that position Prichard
retained the brain as the organ which mediated between the external world and human
conscience. He favoured the notion "that particular conditions of the brain are
intermediately and instrumentally co-operative, and interposing themselves between the
disorder of the organ primarily affected, and the state of mind or temper which is traced
as its manifestation or accompaniment'.110 Thus Prichard repeated his theory from
1822.1"' He introduced the Belgian alienist Joseph Guislain as an authority who had set
out the same idea. Guislain was also the author to whom Prichard referred in order to
differentiate between the faculty of judgement and other mental faculties.112 The
correlation shows Prichard's tendency to let philosophy take precedence over anatomical
assumptions. As for the anatomical evidence itself, Prichard relied on the theories of
Achille-Louis Foville, whom he understood to have combined the idea of insanity as
cerebral inflammation with the notion that in some cases the disease was located in the
viscera.113 Prichard tried to steer a middle way between all possible positions. None the
less, even to him the results were not altogether satisfactory: moral insanity in particular
posed a problem. Why should a type of disorder which did not involve the
understanding but only the emotions leave its imprint on the anatomical make-up of the
brain? Indeed, Prichard concluded that "the instances of mental disorder which leave the
greatest doubt with respect to the presence of disease in the brain are those of moral
'07 Ibid., pp. 113-14, 242.
108 Pinel, op. cit., note 42 above, Sect. IV.
109 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 246, 114.
110 Ibid., p. 246.
1 He himselfreferred to his 1822 Treatise on this
point, Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 148. Cuvier
had advanced the same opinion before the Academie
des Sciences when he read out hisjudgement on the
system ofGall and Spurzheim; see Clarke and
Jacyna, op. cit., note 28 above, p. 276.
112 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p.117.
113 Prichard praised the "remarkable accuracy" of
Foville's pathological researches. See Prichard, 'An
address delivered at the third anniversary meeting of
the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association,
July 23d, 1835', in Trans. Prov. med. surg. Ass.,
1836, 4: 1-54, pp. 18-19. Indeed, Prichard thought
that in Foville he had found a fellow-combatant
against phrenology, believing that Foville was "at
issue with the followers ofGall", cf. idem, op. cit.,
note 2 above, p. 480. This was totally erroneous. In
fact, Foville-no less than the bulk ofthe Esquirol
circle-was intrigued by phrenology; cf. Goldstein,
op. cit., note 11 above, p. 256. With regard to
Foville's opinions on the viscera, it seems that
Prichard exaggerated the former's statements. A
reviewer ofthe Treatise on insanity pointed out that
Prichard had not quite grasped Foville's theory, see
[Anon.], 'Greco, Farr, Crowther, &c. on insanity', in
Br.for. med. Rev., 1839, 7: 1-55, on p. 31. Indeed,
Foville tried to prove that the cerebellum was the
seat ofsensation; see Clarke and Jacyna, note 28
above, pp. 297-8.
329Hannah FAugstein
insanity". Had Prichard designated the brain as the locus of the passions and the
sentiments, he would not have had this problem. But his theoretical opposition to
phrenology, which induced him to see the sentiments as part and parcel of the overall
bodily constitution, necessarily led him into this aporia. In other words, he had devised
moral insanity in order to fight the phrenologists, but once the forces of the body were
unleashed, they appeared to threaten his dualist world view.
It was only between the late 1830s and early 1840s, that he finally made up his mind
and yielded to the theories of the Nasse school, accepting moral insanity as a disease of
the viscera. In 1844 Prichard published a brief article reporting a typical case of moral
insanity and revising his former position.114 Now he praised Jacobi wholeheartedly: his
"various works on subjects connected with insanity, equally remarkable for the practical
sense as for the deep philosophical investigation which they display, entitle their author to
the highest rank among the living writers of this class."115 Neither Prichard, nor Jacobi
had changed his theoretical approach to insanity. Nor had Prichard read texts by Jacobi
which presented the German alienist in a new light. The truth is that Prichard had come to
see Jacobi with other eyes. We have seen that he founded his views on the participation of
the brain in mental disorder on a publication by Guislain. Jacobi had, in 1830, argued
against Guislain's theory, Prichard hadtaken notice ofit, without, however, assigning any
importance to Jacobi's criticism.116 By 1844, in contrast, this was exactly the passage
which Prichard summarized in order to point out the similarity between his views and
those ofJacobi. He wrote:
Jacobi has not expressed his opinion precisely in this manner; but it would appear ... that he looks
upon effects produced upon the sensorium and the mind, through the mediumofthe stomach, orany
ofthe viscera of physical life, as not less immediately brought about by the action of the material
organism on the intellectual orsensitive power, than the impressions produced in the mindby ablow
on the head, or by any powerful agency exerted immediately on the brain.
The sequence ofevents as Jacobi saw it was, Prichard continued, intimately related to his
own theory ofmoral insanity. More expressly than before, he presented moral insanity as
a disease whose very existence proved the wrongfulness ofphrenology:
The phenomena of moral insanity, or of a disordered state of the affections and moral feelings,
without any corresponding lesion of the understanding, or of the reasoning faculties, fumishes, or
appears at least, primafacie, to fumish a finn ground whereon to maintain the negative position in
regard to the participation, or, at least, the primary influence of the brain, in the development of an
extensive series ofpsychological phenomena."17
If we ask why Prichard finally recognized the kinship between his ideas and those of
the Germans, an explanation may be found in his frustration with the French medical
scene. Alienists such as Pinel and Esquirol had been ihterested in the relation between
men's passions and mental derangements. But this phase lasted for only two decades.
After Esquirol's death in 1840, his pupils who, much more than Esquirol, employed
114 Prichard, op. cit., note 41 above. 117 Prichard, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 323.
15 Ibid., p. 323.
116 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 3, p. 89;
Prichard, op. cit. note 2 above, pp. 242-3.
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physicalist theories which were not tempered by religiosity, took over the field ofdebate.
By the 1830s, French theorizing upon madness was dominated by the anatomical
approach and the attempt to depict correlations between cerebral lesions and mental
disorder.118 Even Foville, whom Prichard had relied on in his 1835 Treatise, proved an
enthusiastic phrenologist.'19 Prichard did not conceal his exasperation with contemporary
trends in anatomy. In 1844, he regretted that "in England and France, the principal, ifnot
the almost undivided attention ofanatomists has been directed to the discovery ofmorbid
changes in the brain". The Germans, even though they were generally neither "more
practical" nor "sound", had at least taken "a different course":
the school of Nasse, in particular, directed the attention of pathologists to connections which are
often to be traced between the different manifestations of insanity and various morbid phenomena
discovered after death in the organs subservient to physical life [i.e. the viscera].120
AfterEsquirol's death, there was no French alienist left who stood in Prichard's favour.
In other respects, too, the links between his theories and those of the French had been
severed. It had been Esquirol himself who had rejected Prichard's definition of moral
insanity. In his lastpublication, he insisted that in Prichard's "folie morale ... intelligence
is more or less disturbed".121 Also, Esquirol had insisted that Prichard's moral insanity
had nothing to do with Pinel's "manie sans delire", and that an "'outbreak of furious
madness without delusion' . . . is very distinct from that form of mental derangement
which I have described under the term 'Moral Insanity"'.122 Thanks to Esquirol's
correction, Prichard came to distinguish between moral insanity and "instinctive
madness". "It was observed-by M. Esquirol", he wrote with approval, "that this affection
is totally distinct from that which I have described first in the Cyclopaedia of Practical
Medicine". Instinctive madness comprised disorders involving violent fits of anger.'23
Moral insanity, by contrast, was in general far less violent.
Prichard reconsidered his stance towards Jacobi after he lost sympathy for the French
scene. I should like to suggest that the persistent menace of phrenology helped to drive
Prichard into the arms ofthe Nasse school. He retained his assumption thatthe brain acted
as a mediator between impressions ofthe mind and body, but now he conceded that
the most important thing, in a practical point ofview, is to establish the fact that the principal and
fundamental cause ofinsanity is, in many instances, to be sought, not in the brain, but in some other
region ofthe body.
118 Weiner, op. cit., note 87 above, p. 388. jurisprudence. Designedfor the use ofpersons
119 In 1840, Prichard's former praise ofFoville had concerned in legal questions regarding unsoundness
given way to a detached and even sceptical ofmind, London, Bailliere, 1842. So far, no historian
evaluation; cf. Prichard, op. cit., note 5 above, who has dealt with Prichard's moral insanity has
p. 127. been aware ofthis distinction. Joel Peter Eigen is the
120 Prichard, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 323-4. most recent example, see Eigen, op. cit., note 6
121 Esquirol, 'Monomanie', op. cit., note 14 above, above, pp. 77-9. This is important because Eigen
p. 5. interprets Prichard's moral insanity as related to the
122 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 93; Prichard notion ofdisorders ofthe will. Had he heeded
referred to Esquirol, op. cit., note 121 above, p. 63. Prichard's emphasis that instinctive mania and moral
123 In 1842 Prichard treated instinctive madness insanity were two different nosological categories, he
and moral insanity separately in chs 5 and 9 of On might have come to another conclusion.
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Jacobi was credited with assenting to Prichard's theory of moral insanity, i.e., "that a
mental disorder exists, fully to be recognised by particular trains of symptoms, in which
the moral, not the intellectual, part of the human mind is essentially disturbed".124
Prichard's little article from 1844 concluded the issues which have been discussed so far,
namely his defiance of the phrenologists through the theory of moral insanity, and the
notion that moral insanity was tied to a disorder in the viscera and thus to the entire
constitution ofthe body.
Moral Insanity: a Product ofSelf-Centredness
How deeply the theory ofmoral insanity was informed by implicit beliefsystems which
stood in an indirect and complicated relationship with medicine itselfmay become evident
in the following example. Prichard presented the pathological findings in question as ifhe
had only been waiting for anatomical evidence to prove that moral insanity arose from a
disease of the viscera. He cited the case of "a lady highly accomplished, and of great
mental endowments, pious, affectionate, and sincere" who suddenly became "low-spirited
and hypochondriacal". At the same time she refused to eat. When her friends and family
urged her, she complained about pains in the abdomen. "Her whole temper and character
became changed. Formerly devoted to her duties, and to works ofbenevolence to others,
she now thought only ofherself, and hercomplaints". Finally, she was sent into an asylum
where she "was induced, though not without great difficulty, and a constant threat of
compulsion if she resisted, to take a moderate quantity of the most nutritious and
digestible food". Subsequently she died. The dissection showed that her intestinal canal
was beset with ulcers and tubercles. Now, instead ofconcluding, that this woman was not
mad, but did indeed suffer terrible pain and therefore had reason to reject food, Prichard
took the morbid evidence in the abdomen as testifying to the truth ofhis theory on moral
insanity:
... the perpetual complaints made by the patient of pain and suffering in the abdomen had an
organic cause, and were not unreal, as it had been sometimes suspected. As these complaints had
been uniform, and had continued from the commencement of the disease, it may be inferred as
highly probable that the organic disease in the intestinal canal had been coeval with the mental
disorder, and the foundation of the whole train of morbid symptoms. The history of this case
furnishes, on this view, an example ofinsanity mainly dependant on a diseased state oforgans very
remote from the brain.125
It is significant that Prichard described the patient as being obsessed with herself-"she
now thought only of herself'. To identify self-centredness as a feature of insanity was
common also among the members ofthe Nasse school. Thus Jacobi wrote that the "forces
of selfishness" strive in man "against revelation", only by overcoming the "forces of
nature" could man's soul liberate itself. But time and again, nature proved stronger. Jacobi
concluded: "Nothing can stop man in this temptation, which threatens shattering and
124 Prichard, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 323. insanity", but he suggested that this might be
125 Ibid., p. 324. Prichard added that "Serous "regarded rather as an effect than a cause" of
effusion, indeed, existed within the skull; and this is madness.
known to be a very frequent phenomenon in cases of
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extinction, but the firm belief in the Truth . . . ofrevelation".126 Unlike Esquirol's pupils
in France, the somaticist branch of German Romantic physiology explicitly and
persistently referred to metaphysical convictions; in their understanding, insanity was
concomitant, as it were, with a break-up of the ties which linked an individual to his
transcendental nature.127 In that sense, Prichard and Jacobi made common cause. Both of
them partook seriously in the anxieties of their age, the uprooting of traditional
hierarchies, subsequent social upheavals, a burgeoning acquisitiveness hitherto unknown,
scientific materialism-it was all indicative of far-reaching moral depravity. In a speech
in 1835, Prichard sighed about "these days, when intellect is deified and worshipped as
the sole divinity".128 The country which seemed to furnish ample reason for misgivings
was France. In the wake of the revolution, religious observance had reached an all-time
low. Selfish passions were no longer held in check. Jacobi implicitly conflated socially
egoistic behaviour with the exaggerated self-centredness of the insane. In the end, both
were attributable to loss ofreligion. Prichard saw things similarly. He translated apassage
from Jacobi on the moral debasement of the French: "the generality of men have their
understanding impaired through the influence of lower passions, and of vices" which
Jacobi considered as "so much the more prevalent" as the Christian moral standard was
on the decline.129
For Britain, the writing was on the wall. In 1831, Prichard's home town Bristol was
shaken by a riot oflabourers and paupers. The major public buildings were burned down,
troops were called in.-In the end, not only were the chief rioters put on trial but also a
military captain, the mayor and aldermen were arraigned for their "apathetic" conduct
during the upheaval.130 In short, it seemed that nobody, neither the poor nor their betters,
had lived up to their civic duties. Not only France, but Britain too gave reason for
concern.131
Esquirol, in his time the greatest and most influential authority on alienation in France,
was politically conservative enough to provide Prichard with rich quotes on the
detrimental effects of moral decline. But unlike Jacobi, Nasse and Prichard, Esquirol
engaged with French positivism, and his theories did not revolve around notions of
redemption and life after death. Hence Esquirol's misgivings as to the contemporary state
of morality were tied rather more to the course of civilization than to the individual's
readiness to transcend his own self.132 By the time Napoleon had been despatched to St.
Helena, it was permissible for conservatives to cite Rousseau. For Esquirol, backed by
126 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 2, p. 314 130 John Latimer, Annals ofBristol in the
("die selbstsuchtigen Triebe . . . streben gegen die nineteenth century, Bath, Kingsmead Reprints, 1970,
Offenbarung"). p. 178. For the historical context see Michael Neve,
127 For the political and social implications of 'Natural philosophy, medicine and the culture of
French medicine see Erwin H Ackerknecht, Medicine science in provincial England: the case ofBristol,
at the Paris Hospital, 1794-1848, Baltimore, Johns 1780-1850, and Bath, 1750-1820', PhD thesis,
Hopkins University Press, 1967; Charles Coulston University College London, 1984, ch. 4.
Gillispie, Science andpolity in France at the endof 131 Martin Wiener has depicted the great Victorian
the old regime, Princeton University Press, 1980; anxiety that the demise oftraditional hierarchies
Martin L Gross, 'The lessened focus offeeling: a would inevitably lead to the loss ofpublic order:
transformation in French physiology in the early Martin Wiener, Reconstructing the criminal: culture,
nineteenth century', J. Hist. Biol., 1979, 12: 231-71. law, andpolicy in England, 1830-1914, Cambridge
128Prichard, 'Address', op. cit., note 113 above, p. 39. University Press, 1981.
129 Jacobi, op. cit. note 55 above, vol. 1, p. 24, 132 See note 105 above.
quoted in Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 196.
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Rousseau, it was evident that civilized man had so far departed from propriety and
decency that madness must be on the rise. Prichard chose Esquirol's texts to express his
own misgivings.'33 "During the last thirty years," Prichard said through the words of
Esquirol, "the changes which have taken place in our manners in France, have been
productive of more cases of insanity than our political torments". With the demise of
religious observance in France, Esquirol stated, "demonomania and superstitious madness
have disappeared". But instead of ushering in an epoch which was mentally saner, this
change caused the reverse to happen. The pivotal role ofreligion for the upkeep of social
order was a commonplace in the early nineteenth century. Esquirol had established what
happened in a country with weak religious foundations: "The influence of religion over
theconduct ofthepeoplebeing weakened, in ordertokeep men in obedience governments
have had recourse to police". This had a dire consequence; "it is the police which haunts
weak imaginations. Asylums are filled with monomaniacs, who, fearing this authority,
have gone mad upon the subject, and believe that they are constantly pursued."'34
Esquirol deplored the substitution of selfishness for ethics:
A cold egotism has dried up all the sources of sentiment: there no longer exist domestic affections,
respect, attachment, authority, or reciprocal dependencies; every one lives for himself; none are
anxious to form those wise and salutary provisions which ought to connect the present age with
those which are destined to follow it.135
The Burkean overtones in this passage are evident. But Burke's target, the revolution, was
history. Esquirol was talking about another kind of social lesion, he called it "perfect
selfishness",136 Jacobi called itSelbstsuchtI37-it was the disease ofthe age ofcapitalism.
Many contemporaries perceived thatthey were living through aphase ofchange. The way
in which they theorized this is indicative of their political standpoints as well as of their
ontology.
Some writers attributed the apparent change of manners to a reorganization of society
as a whole, or to a changed mode of production. Others would not follow the turn to
sociological analysis in the course ofwhich they saw morality being relativized and ruled
out as an explanatory category. The notion of alienation was widespread. But some
philosophers-most famously, of course, Karl Marx-came to see this as a socio-
economic phenomenon, whereas philosophizing physiologists such as Prichard, Jacobi,
and Esquirol regarded it as aphenomenon which was staged within human consciousness.
It expressed itself in terms of a separation between men's social identity and their
metaphysically grounded morality.
The whole movement delineated so far, as well as Prichard's reliance on German
theoreticians, characterizes not just his medicine, but also his anthropology. Prichard
accounted for the different varieties of mankind by linking humoralism and
environmentalism. Thus he could reject the notion of distinct human races, while at the
133 Prichard often, and especially when religious 135 The quote is from Prichard, op. cit., note 2
issues were touched upon, expressed as his own above, p.192. The original is in Esquirol, op. cit.,
views remarks which other authors had made. note 14 above. vol. 1, p. 49.
134 The passage was quoted in Prichard, op. cit., 136 It was one ofthe ten salient characteristics of
note 5 above, p. 115. The original is in Esquirol, 'De moral insanity; Prichard, op. cit., note 5 above,
la lypemanie ou melancholie', 401, in idem, op. cit., p. 113.
note 14 above, vol. 1, pp. 398-481. 137 Jacobi, op. cit., note 55 above, vol. 2, p. 314.
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same time eschewing the pitfalls ofexternal, i.e., "materialistic", determinism.138 In both
anthropology and medicine, Prichard was concerned to fend off the growing importance
attached to the brain and consequently the construction of hierarchies along the lines of
increasing cerebral complexity. The latter amounted in his eyes to an erosion ofindividual
moral responsibility.139
Gloom as Part ofthe Human Condition
Prichard's deep piety was tied to the framework of natural theology. In all his writings
Prichard was involved in a scientific theodicy, questioning why it had pleased God to
inflict man with madness. We have seen how Prichard took his views on this matter from
Hancock's Essay on instinct, and how he explained insanity as part of the human
constitution and as a necessary corollary to the human ability to entertain fear for the
future. It was, however, not just the "anticipation of wants" which was implanted in the
human soul, but also theexpectation of"a state ofexistence afterdeath".140 Human beings
were endowed with foresight in order to survive during their earthly existence. Equally,
the awareness ofthe Fall and ofa future day ofjudgement was given to them so that they
could govern their behaviour in such a manner as to deserve redemption on the day of
atonement. Indeed, Prichard conceived of an inherent and eternal fear which was
constitutionally implanted in men's mental fabric: "there is one feature common to them
all," he wrote, "their prevailing character is gloomy ... A persuasion ofmoral demerit or
aconsciousness ofguilt has been deeply impressed upon the minds ofmen in all ages".14'
It was certainly no accident that the word "gloom" appeared also in the context of
insanity. In his contribution to Alexander Tweedie's Library of medicine, Prichard
mentioned melancholy as characteristic of patients suffering from moral insanity:
"persons in this state have no relish for the enjoyments oflife; they express nofeelings of
consolation or happiness in the prospect of a future existence; they view everything
through a medium of gloom".142 If gloom, then, tormented the sound as well as the
unsound, what was the difference between the two states ofmind other than a question of
degree? When Prichard said that a disposition to madness was part of the human
constitution, this mustbe understood as his way ofsaying thatmankindpaid with madness
for the Fall. Without anxiety, fear, and gloom, men would not behave as they should in
order to ensure their survival andredemption after death.143 But these very qualities were,
so to speak, too much for the human constitution. Hence, in each individual case, the
exciting causes which led to the outbreak of madness were merely the last straw. Mental
sanity did not prevent the sound-minded from sharing in the gloom of damnation with
138 SeePrichard, op. cit., note 81 above. 141 Idem, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 190.
139 For a full assessment ofPrichard's 142 Idem, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 113 (my
anthropology see my PhD thesis op. cit., note 45 emphasis).
above. Other accounts ofPrichard's anthropology are 143 This interpretation is in line with Hilton's
in Bynum, op. cit., note 29 above, pp. 70-118; account of the theological notion ofguilt and
Stocking, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. ix-cxvii; idem, atonement during the first half of the nineteenth
Victorian anthropology, New York, Free Press, 1987. century. Boyd Hilton, The age ofatonement, the
140 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 189, see also influence ofevangelicalism on social and economic
idem, op. cit., note 81 above, vol. 1, pp. 175-6. thought, 1795-1865, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988.
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which the diseased were inflicted. The difference was only that the sane managed to pull
themselves together and fulfil their daily duties, while the morally insane "remain ...
moping and silent in their beds."144
This interpretation of Prichard's thoughts on mankind and madness is in line with the
fact that he was very reluctant to accept the category of religious madness'. He shared
Heinroth's belief that piety was the best preventive against insanity. For Prichard, true
Protestant belief simply could not plunge people into lunacy; in his opinion, it was never
the prevalence but rather the loss of religion which made people prone to insanity. He
defended this stance against the statistics which seemed to illustrate the contrary.145 And
although he firmly rejected Heinroth's notion that madness was a disease of the
immaterial mind, he sympathized with the idea that "moral depravity was the essential
cause ofmadness". Heinroth's view had, forPrichard, "some foundation in truth ... Vices,
inordinate passions, and the want of mental discipline" indeed tended "to increase the
prevalence ofinsanity'.l146
The Social Significance ofMoral Insanity
An attempt has been made to show that moral insanity must be understood as a
corollary ofPrichard's conservatism in a struggle which was taking place on many levels:
reform versus counter-revolution; materialist physiology versus organismic holism of
body and soul; purely sociological versus "moral" or psychological explanations;
secularization versus metaphysics. In this light I suggest that it does not make sense to
interpret moral insanity as the concomitant ofPrichard's endeavour to bolsterthe status of
his profession. He did not aim at medically curbing the lower classes by putting forward
moral insanity; nor did he devise the concept in order to facilitate a medical distinction
between the good and the bad, the sane and the mad. Of course, there are non-medical
origins of moral insanity, but these are to be found primarily in Prichard's moral
convictions.
Stocking has repeated the suggestion, raised by Carlson and Dain, that Prichard's
choice of the term moral insanity simply referred to "a weakness or disease of the moral
sense",.147 Against this allegation other historians stressed that Prichard's use of the term
"moral" had no ethical allusions.148 In fact, however, both propositions have a point. For
Prichard, moral insanity was a moral perversion in both senses, leading to a dislocation of
the moral sentiment as well as of morality. Prichard knew that ethics had nothing do to
with medicine, and yet he could not help finding some truth in Heinroth's theory that
insanity rose out ofsin. It linked up with his beliefthat the causes ofmoral insanity were,
44 Prichard, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 113. 147 Stocking, op. cit., note 16 above, p. xxx;
145 Idem, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 187-202. Carlson and Dain, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 134.
146 Ibid., pp. 235, 238. As for an assessment ofhis 148 Walker and McCabe refer the misinterpretation
theories see Luc S Cauwenbergh, 'J. Chr. Heinroth to Prichard's usage of the word "moral" with its
(1773-1843): psychiatrist ofthe German Romantic varying ethical and psychological connotations.
era', Hist. Psychiatry, 1991, 2: 365-84; George Their views were adopted by later scholars. Walker
Mora, 'Introduction', in J C A Heinroth, Textbook of and MacCabe, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 208; Hunter
disturbances ofmental life, ordisturbances ofthe and Macalpine, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 838;
soul and their treatment, trans. J Schmorak, Smith, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 114.
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2 vols,
1975; Verwey, op. cit., note 43 above, pp. 9-22.
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more often than not, of a moral rather than a physical kind.149 Moral insanity was
Prichard's way of theorizing what appeared to him as the moral degeneracy of his age.
Hence, it may be doubted that Prichard had all that much in common with alienists, such
as Heinroth, who conflated immorality with disease, or with those such as Thomas Mayo,
who suggested that workhouses should be introduced for disobedient children and other
morally deficient individuals.150 An appropriate way to resolve this question is to look at
the implications which moral insanity had for the mechanics of certification within
Prichard's theory itself.
In the late 1820s, the practice of confinement had become highly controversial,
culminating in a scandal which involved the well-known alienist George Man Burrows
who had issued certificates without even personally inspecting the alleged patients.151
These events stirred up controversies about the validity oftheories on madness. Part ofthe
problem was the wide gap between the definition of insanity as it was accepted in the
courts, and its actual exegesis in the practice of certification. Generally, only those
criminals who displayed real hallucinations or illusions were passed as mentally unsound.
But quite often people were subject to certification whose mental frame failed to display
that sort of extreme mental aberration.152 One of the medical men who took up the issue
was the young alienist John Conolly. In 1830, he published a treatise which strongly
criticized contemporary abuses in the mad-business. Nowadays, Conolly is deemed the
prototype of a medical reformer: young, radical-minded, at the fringe of the London
establishment and an adherent of craniology as a useful instrument for mental
pathology.'53 One of the prime features in his Inquiry concerning the indications of
insanity was his condemnation of the indiscriminate confinement of people who were
merely eccentric or depraved.'54
It has been shown that Prichard understood madness to be a necessary part of human
nature. Moral insanity in particular constituted an extension of the definition of madness
which makes-in theory-an infinitely greater number ofpeople eligible for the diagnosis
ofmadness than the traditional notion had allowed for. The question which must be raised
in this context is whether moral insanity was meant to resolve the theoretical ambiguities
around the practice ofthe mad-business in such a manner as to boost asylumdom. As will
become clear, this was not so.
No less than Conolly, Prichard favoured confinement in all appropriate cases.
Following Esquirol and the long tradition ofBritish associationism, he thought that insane
patients needed to be distracted from their usual surroundings, so that their minds could
149 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 174. which he described in op. cit., note 123 above,
150 Cf. Thomas Mayo, An essay on the relation of pp. 226-7.
the theory ofmorals to insanity, London, Fellowes, 153 Cf. Richard Hunter, Ida Macalpine,
1834. 'Introduction' to: John Conolly, An inquiry
151 This has been demonstrated in Akihito Suzuki's concerning the indications ofinsanity, London,
paper, 'The structure of the psychiatric bedside', Dawsons, 1964; Andrew Scull, 'A Victorian alienist:
given at the conference "'Voices from the past": John Conolly, FRCP, DCL (1794-1866)', in Bynum,
source materials for the history ofpsychiatry' at the Porter, Shepherd (eds), op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1,
Wellcome Institute for the History ofMedicine on pp. 103-50.
10 Feb. 1995. 154 John Conolly, An inquiry concerning the
152 Prichard himself was aware that given the indications ofinsanity, with suggestionsfor the
unsatisfactory state oflegal practice, expedience betterprotection and care ofthe insane, London,
would occasionally overrule the law, see the case John Taylor, 1830.
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leave their morbid tracks ofthought.155 He endorsed a combination of the humane form
of moral treatment and the traditional physical treatment of bleeding, purging, vomiting,
etc. But in cases of moral insanity, Prichard assumed a very careful stance towards
confinement. He acknowledged that it was difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition
oflunacy for diagnosis. "The precise limitation ofinsanity and eccentricity ofcharacter is
very difficult to discover," he wrote, and referred his readers to Conolly's book.'56
One ofConolly's examples ofan eccentric who should not be confined is a man whose
only madness consists in his beliefthat his legs are made ofbutter. As long as they could
somehow carry on in life, Conolly thought, men were free to think what they wanted, mad
or not.157 As for Prichard, his typical borderline case was a morally insane individual
whose awkward behaviour was due to deranged emotion. But, no less than Conolly,
Prichard took it for granted that mere eccentricity ofcharacter was no reason for locking
a person up. Even in cases ofpeople who were so morally insane as to be unable to fulfil
their civil responsibilities, Prichard did not suggest confinement.158 He wrote:
There are probably many individuals who are wholly incompetent, through a habit of thoughtless
extravagance resulting from disease, to administer their own estates, or manage their domestic
affairs, and in whose condition there is yet nothing that requires confinement in a madhouse.159
It is, therefore, wrong to see Prichard as a man who was enthusiastic about confinement.
In fact, he agreed with Conolly's exhortation for care in these matters.160
Prichard saw it as his duty to deal with the medico-legal side of madness. In 1842, he
dedicated an entire book to the subject in which he covered both sides of the problem:
criminality arising from insanity as well as the circumstances in which civil law coulddeal
with insane behaviour. This dual perspective notwithstanding, his interest focused mainly
on those aspects of insanity which came under civil rather than criminal law.161 He
stressed that the question of certification was a matter which could not be solved
categorically.
The question which jurors will have to determine is, not whether the person whose case is under
examination is afflicted with insanity according to any abstract definition, or general notion, as to
the nature ofthat disease, but whether his mental state is individually such as to render him unfit to
be at large, and to be entrusted with the care ofhimself and his property.'62
Instead of deriving the criteria for certification from medical nosology, Prichard
recommended that an alleged madman's social behaviour should be the criterion for his
possible certification. This pragmatic advice originated with John Haslam. In 1817, after
155 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 341. dated 24.7.1843, in Crossley papers, autograph
156 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 383; Conolly, collection, vol.3, Manchester Central Library.
op. cit., note 154 above, p. 173. Prichard had not 161 This was due to the fact that murder was not a
always been a supporter ofmoral treatment, see his typical manifestation ofmoral insanity. It is notable
'Remarks on the treatment ofepilepsy and some that Prichard failed to give any attention to the
other nervous diseases', Edinburgh med. J., 1815, famous trials which had agitated British discussion
11: 458-66, p. 465. about forensic medicine since the turn ofthe century,
157 Conolly, op. cit., note 154 above, pp. 136, 173. and he was duly criticized for this. See [Anon.],
158 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 23 ff, 45. 'Prichard, Winslow, &c. on the plea ofinsanity in
59 Ibid., p. 402. criminal cases', Br.for. med. Rev., 1843, 16: 81-110,
160 Prichard thought very highly indeed ofConolly. p. 87.
See his letter to the barrister Arthur James Jones 162 Prichard, op. cit., note 123 above, p. 65.
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he had ignominiously lost his post as apothecary to Bethlem hospital, Haslam had made
the very same recommendation.'63 In his case, his unorthodoxy might be seen as a
response tohis shameful experience. But Prichard's cautious attitude towards confinement
fits perfectly with his views on human nature. He had interpreted the doctrine of
predisposing causes in such a manner as to stipulate that the disposition to madness was
part of universal human nature. The consequence was that every kind of peculiar
behaviour was, for him, a sign ofmental disorder. At least once, Prichard asserted that all
eccentricity, however harmless it might appear, was a sign of madness. He wrote: "If ...
weareobligedtodiscuss thequestion, whethereccentricity is in general alliedto madness,
and even a modification of that state or not, there is no doubt that the decision would be
in the affimnative'.l64 This statement is crucial. Nobody in Prichard's time would have
doubted that eccentric behaviour was a very common feature in many individuals.
Conolly, therefore, strove to negate the links between eccentricity and insanity; Prichard,
by contrast, made them even stronger. The reason why he did not recommend treatment
or certification to all individuals who were, in his understanding, mad is simply this: had
this policy been implemented, a substantial part of the population would have had to be
certified.
His personal attitude as a doctor sustains this interpretation. As a practitioner as well as
in his capacity as aCommissioner inLunacy,165 he exercised his duties with modesty, like
a craft whose effectiveness was limited. He presented himself in his writings very
differently from medical authors such as Burrows or Esquirol. He did not stress any
special faculties ofhis own, comparable to Francis Willis's famous stare, nor did he give
much credit to his role as a diagnosing specialist. Nor, for that matter, was he interested in
the patients telling their stories. Rather, the diagnosis of moral insanity must rely on the
testimony ofpeople who had known the patient for some time, because one ofthe salient
characteristics ofthe disorder consisted in a change ofcharacter.
A Disease ofthe Rich
This brings us to the social implications ofmoral insanity. When Prichard discussed the
expediency ofconfinement, he said:
Confinement is unnecessary for such a person, who is in no way dangerous to society. If the
management of his property-for such individuals are generally possessed ofproperty-could be
so settled as to ensure his having the usual supports oflife, this would be sufficient.166
Buried in this sentence is a decisive aspect of moral insanity. It was usually a disorder of
the affluent. And it was adisorder which was a lot morerespectable than otherideas about
unsoundness of mind. In a way, moral insanity served to create a class of patients who
were not liable to be confounded with beastly imbeciles and the debilitated.
163 John Haslam, Medicaljurisprudence as it down: the Lunacy Commission and the psychiatric
relates to insanity, according to the law ofEngland, profession 1845-60', in Bynum, Porter, Shepherd
London, C Hunter, 1817, p. 63. (eds), op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 2, on pp. 106, 108.
164 Prichard, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 112. 166 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 402 (my
165 For Prichard's role as a Commissioner in emphasis).
Lunacy see Nicholas Hervey, 'A slavish bowing
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The notion of a civil disease for the upper strata of society can be seen as linking up
with Prichard's hesitation to recommendconfinement: it all pandered tothe attitudes ofan
educated class of possible clients. Asylums had in those days a poor reputation with the
general public,'67 and it was very much in the interest of an alienist to play down the
importance ofconfinement. Hence Prichard's claim that in some forms ofmoral insanity
it was sufficient to take the management ofhis property out ofthe hands ofthe disturbed
individual. To see moral insanity in this manner, as a polite form of madness, was a
concomitant of Prichard's assumption that the disorder was characteristic ofcivilization.
Brute men-savages as well as peasant folk-were not refined enough for the "cold
egotism" which held sway in modem life and which was to a large extent responsible for
the rising numbers ofmadmen. Also, the particular type ofanxieties modem men suffered
from, loss offortune orprofessional ambition, were not to be found in primitive societies.
Prichard commented:
The apparent increase is everywhere so striking, that it leaves on the mind a strong suspicion ...
thatcases ofinsanity are far more numerous than formerly.... It is encouraged by the reflexion that
the state of society is, in most countries, such as appears likely to multiply the exciting causes of
madness.... Sufficient evidence has arisen to confirm in a great measure the remark made, many
years ago by M. Esquirol, that insanity belongs almost exclusively to civilized races of men: it
scarcely exists among savages, and is rare in barbarous countries.168
What applied to insanity broadly speaking and to different stages ofcivilization, was true
for moral insanity as well. Given that Prichard considered all his contemporaries to be
liable to moral insanity, he logically assumed that the "more civilized" strata of society
were more endangered than the lower classes. The aetiology of moral insanity covered
many symptoms which were not dependent on social status. Yet there was an old tradition
which regarded the refined classes as more susceptible to feeling than the ordinary strata
of society. Moral insanity, defined as a disease of the passions, was therefore especially
prevalent among refined and propertied people.
With moral insanity, Prichard devised a model disease which explained in psychiatric
terms the despicable moral corruption ofhis times and, in particular, ofthe affluent, who
had the means to indulge in "moral debasement" until they were mad. Paradoxically, this
very aspect ofthe disease was apt to make it more palatable to the public. The creation of
167 Two parliamentary inquiries and the subsequent
popularizations oftheir findings could not fail to
make the public wary ofmalpractice in the asylums.
See, for example, Andrew Scull, The mostsolitary of
afflictions, note 9 above, pp. 115-46; see also Peter
McCandless, 'Liberty and lunacy: the Victorians and
wrongful confinement', in Andrew Scull (ed.),
Madhouses, mad-doctors andmadmen: the social
history ofpsychiatry in the Victorian era,
Philadelphia, University ofPennsylvania Press,
1981.
168 Prichard, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 350, see also
p. 175 where Prichard discusses the truth ofthis
hypothesis. Esquirol frequently suggested that
madness was a typical disease ofcivilization, see,
e.g., Esquirol, Despassions, considere'es comme
causes, symptomes et moyens curatifs de l'alie'nation
mentale, Paris, Didot Jeune, an XIV (1805), in
Collection des theses, Paris, 1805, no. 574, p. 15. As
to historiographical accounts ofthe dangers of
civilization see Mark D Altschule, 'The concept of
civilization as a social evil in the writings ofmid-
nineteenth-century psychiatrists', in idem, Essays in
the history ofpsychiatry, 2nd rev. ed., New York,
London, Grune & Stratton, 1965; Jean-Christophe
Coffin, 'Is modem civilization sick? The response of
alienists in mid-nineteenth-century France', in
Leonie de Goei, Joost Vijselaar (eds), Proceedings of
the Ist European Congress on the History of
Psychiatry andMental Health Care, Rotterdam,
Erasmus, 1993; Andrew Scull, 'Was insanity
increasing?' in idem, Social order/mental disorder,
op. cit., note 9 above.
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the concept could be called a cunning selling strategy, except that its formulation was a
result ofPrichard's views on human nature and his despair at the moral depravation ofhis
time.
In addition to this link between moral insanity and the affluent classes, there is another
respect in which the consideration ofproperty was pivotal in Prichard's thought. Prichard
put forward his pleas for confinement in certain cases, first of all, in the name of social
order: "Of all these arrangements the maintenance ofpublic order is the principal object,
and the second is the preservation ofthe property belonging to the lunatic and the interest
of his family."'69 It is notable that Prichard's concern circled around notions ofproperty
and the avoidance of social upheaval. Esquirol, bt contrast, had put much greater
emphasis on propriety.'70 Esquirol's theory was suitable for post-revolutionary French
society where the aristocracy as well as the high bourgeoisie tried to re-establish distinct
social hierarchies. For him, much more than for Prichard, nymphomania and satyriasis
were diseases concomitant with civil society.'7' Property was not one ofthe topics which
specially preoccupied Esquirol. For Prichard, however, it was not social hierarchy but the
preservation ofpeace and order which was at the centre ofhis concern. Legal interference
was needed when a mentally disturbed person threatened to harm himself, otherpeople or
their property. Society had not only the right, but the duty to interfere with persons who,
like Symonds's gentleman patient, squandered their possessions and threatened to throw
their families into poverty.'72
Insanity was, for Prichard, a prevalent menace. It was not an exceptional misfortune,
but rather a predicament society had to live with. All eccentric behaviour was indicative
of a deranged mind. It was impossible to get rid of the affliction altogether, and since
many eccentrics did no harm to anybody, their behaviour could be tolerated. But for the
sake ofsocial cohesion society had to defend itselfwhen its law and order were attacked.
This is why Prichard chose the preservation of social order, of property and personal
safety, as the criteria for certification.
Conclusion
Moral insanity arose primarily out of Prichard's theological interest in sustaining the
doctrine ofthe immaterial soul. Theconcept was expressive ofhis views on theprecarious
morality of modern man rather than ofhis desire to draw definite dividing lines between
the sound and the unsound. For Prichard, man's mental health was ultimately tied to his
religion. He was a medical dualist who thought that medicine could not do much for the
mind.173 In so far as madness was a physical disease medicine could cure it; ifthat failed
it could aid the law in preserving the social order.
169Prichard, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 135. 172 Exaggerated thrift and "thepropensity to make
170 Henriques has shown that property was the extravagantpurchases" were only two among a wide
rationale for British restoration ideology. See Ursula range of symptoms ofmoral insanity. None the less,
R Q Henriques, Before the welfare state: social they play an important role in Prichard's aetiology.
administration in early industrial Britain, London, See Prichard, op. cit., note 123 above, p. 2; idem, op.
New York, Longman, 1979. cit., note 5 above, p. 112 (his emphasis).
171 In his doctoral thesis, Esquirol explained in 173 For a discussion of Prichard's dualism see my
physiological terms why the sexual passions were so PhD thesis, op. cit., note 45 above.
particularly delicate, see Esquirol, op. cit., note 168
above, p.12.
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Ironically, the course of events took a direction which was directly opposed to
Prichard's designs. His zealous endeavour to sustain the doctrine of the soul against
contemporary forms of medical materialism inadvertently supported another form of
secularization of the mind. Prichard had referred the mechanisms of psychology to the
body in order to preserve the soul's untainted immateriality. In the second half of the
nineteenth century, as Michael Clark has shown, alienists would enlarge upon ideas which
formed the physicalist part of the Prichardian anthropology.'74 The notion of atonement,
however, which included the whole of humanity, was lost. While Prichard had fought
phrenology, his successors were to combine it with moral insanity. In the later decades of
the nineteenth century, theories about hereditary mental degeneration were spreading.
Accordingly, men were doomed by birth, not metaphysically but in terms oftheirphysical
heritage. How easily these notions could be combined with moral insanity is exemplified
in the articles of John Kitching. In the 1850s, Kitching served as the medical
superintendent ofthe York Retreat. In his contributions to the British Medical Journal he
applied doctrines of phrenology and hereditary degeneration to the concept of moral
insanity. Madness was for him solely a question of "disordered functions of the brain".
Moral insanity was the "arrested development in those parts of the brain, which are
concerned in the due performance ofthe moral and instinctive faculties".175
In legal practice, by contrast, moral insanity failed to become an accepted category.
Prichard's attempt to help the legal enforcement of morality proved fruitless. The
McNaughton rules of 1842 confirmed the persistence of the orthodox definition of
madness which presupposed outright delusion.176 In the end, Prichard's endeavours were
stifled. British law did not acknowledge moral insanity as he had hoped. Victorian
alienists misinterpreted it.177 While Prichard had managed to hold a careful balance
between the organic sources of the disease and its effects on man's morality on the one
hand, and the organic implications of man's metaphysical framework on the other hand,
subsequent generations confined moral insanity and its implications entirely to the
physical sphere. Moral insanity, Prichard's legacy to medical psychiatry, was employed in
174 Michael Clark, "'Morbid introspection",
unsoundness ofmind, and British psychological
medicine, c. 1830-1900', in Bynum, Porter,
Shepherd (eds), op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 3.
17, John Kitching, 'Lecture on moral insanity', Br.
med. J., 1857, i: 334-6, 389-91, 453-6. For notions
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Saunders, 'Quarantining the weak-minded:
psychiatric definitions ofdegeneracy and the late-
Victorian asylum', in Bynum, Porter, Shepherd (eds),
op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 3. For theories on
degeneration in general see Peter Burgener, Die
Einflusse des zeitgenossischen Denkens in Morels
Begriffder "dgeine6rescence", Zurich, Juris-Verlag,
1964; Rafael Huertas, 'Madness and degeneration,
III. Degeneration and criminality', Hist. Psychiatry,
1993, 4: 141-58; idem, 'Madness and degeneration,
IV. The man ofgenius', ibid., pp. 301-19; Daniel
Pick, Faces ofdegeneration. A European disorder,
c. 1848-c. 1918, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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Eigen, op. cit., note 6 above, pp.149-52. According
to Smith, "the terms impulsive and moral insanity
... were rarely helpful to the defence strategy";
Smith, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 123. With regard to
the preservation ofproperty, however, the English
legal system did indeed take action: the Lunacy
Regulation Act of 1853 strengthened the system
whereby relatives or heirs of a propertied person
could petition the Lord Chancellor to have the state
take over the stewardship of the estate. The
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177 Cf., e.g., W B Carpenter, Principles ofmental
physiology, 3rd ed., London, Kegan Paul, Trench,
1888 (1874); Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in
mental disease, London, Harry S King, 1874; idem,
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conceptualizations of madness which overrode the transcendental nature of man.
References tothe soul weretobecome atbestthephilosophical superstructure inthebelief
systems ofindividual alienists. But on the whole metaphysics were severed from medical
theories-a development which would have confirmed Prichard's worst misgivings, had
he lived to witness it.
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